

Modern Auth & SSO for Networkers

CISCO Live !

Making sense of modern auth suites for those that miss the good ol' days of RADIUS and TACACS+ :)

Aaron T. Woland, CCIE #20113
Distinguished Engineer, Identity Security

loxx@cisco.com |  @aaronwoland |  aaronwoland

Cisco Webex App


Questions?

Use Cisco Webex App to chat with the speaker after the session

How

- 1 Find this session in the Cisco Live Mobile App
- 2 Click “Join the Discussion”
- 3 Install the Webex App or go directly to the Webex space
- 4 Enter messages/questions in the Webex space

Webex spaces will be moderated by the speaker until June 13, 2025.



<https://ciscolive.ciscoevents.com/ciscolivebot/#BRKSEC-2144>


Important: Hidden Slide Alert

This deck has more information in it than I can present in the time allotted for this session.



Look for this “For Your Reference”
Symbol in your PDF’s

There is a tremendous amount of
hidden content, for you to use later!



For Your
Reference

Please fill out the Survey



If there is anything we can improve, please let us know!

Agenda

- 01 Introduction
- 02 History & AAA
- 03 Enter: Single-Sign-On
- 04 SAML
- 05 OAuth & OIDC
- 06 WebAuthN & Passkeys
- 07 Gotcha's
- 08 Identity Security's Bright Future
- 09 Conclusion(s)

As the unofficial “Cisco History Professor” I tend to explain technology with a bit of a history lesson, so you can understand how we got to where we are.


–Aaron T. Woland
random guy in IT since the Dinosaurs

**“Authentication, Authorization
& Accounting is an age-old
security principle that should
apply to all things Security
related”**

- Aaron T Woland, pompous windbag



I'd like 40K from Chuck Robbins' Account



Do You Have
Authentication?
Yes, I Do. Here It Is.

X
Sorry, Aaron Woland is not Authorized
to Access Chuck Robbins' Account



Accounting

AAA in a “networking world”

- In “our” world, we have thought of 2-types of AAA:
 - Controlling access to networks.
 - Dial-up (yes, I’m that old)
 - 802.1X
 - Remote Access VPN
 - Or access to our terminals / CLI’s
 - I.e.: TACACS+
- Basically, we want to know **who and what** is connecting to your network or CLI **before granting access**, and let that access be **specific**.

Network access AAA

ISE is sort of like the “airport security” of the network, if you will.

AuthN


- It validates who you are by checking your credential (username/password/certificate) and that the credential is trusted.
 - Did the username/password match
 - Was the certificate signed by a trusted authority
 - Proof of possession

AuthZ

- It validates the device is allowed
 - Is it an allowed type (Profile)
 - Does it meet the security requirements (Posture)

Application Access

- While WE spend so much time focused on network authentication:
- The same principals are applicable to **applications** & web sites



Application Access


- Must login to web apps (like the Cisco Live app)
- Identify WHO the human is & what access they get to the app
 - Speakers get different access than attendees




Apps could maintain its own User DB




user1 / pwd
user2 / pwd
user3 / pwd



user1 / pwd
user2 / pwd
user3 / pwd



user1 / pwd
user2 / pwd
user3 / pwd




user1 / pwd
user2 / pwd
user3 / pwd

Note: this is not the case for many NEW apps, they rely on the Identity Provider for everything. No local user database. CII (aka: Oort) is an example.

Enter: Identity Management Products

- Solution to keep all user accounts & passwords in sync - across all these web apps.
- Examples:
 - Tivoli Identity Manager
 - Oracle Identity Manager
 - Etc...



Example of what an ID Lifecycle Manager would do when you change your password

*** Cisco Infosec policy won't let me show you the REAL screen, so I mocked up a fake*

Account	Target System	Password Changed?	Result
loxx	Prod AD	Yes	Success
loxx	Linux NIS	Yes	Success
loxx	Stage AD	Yes	Success
aawoland	OpenLDAP	Yes	Success
loxx	Call Mgr	Yes	Success
loxx	WebEx	Yes	Success



System for Cross-domain Identity Management

*SCIM = standard for
automating the exchange of
user identity information
between identity systems.*

Aaron likes to equate it to an LDIF export & import in LDAP


Some tried RADIUS or LDAP logins

- Provided a single location for username/passwords
- But still requires user to login each & every app separately



Bad User Experience

- Still requires a user to log in to each app
 - Same username / password
 - But must use it separately
- Is this Single-Sign-On?



New Term: Federation /fěd" ə-rā'shən/

*Delegation of authority
by otherwise
independent entities*

–Josh Green, Geek

Agenda

- 01 Introduction
- 02 History & AAA
- 03 Enter: Single-Sign-On
- 04 SAML
- 05 OAuth & OIDC
- 06 WebAuthN & Passkeys
- 07 Gotcha's
- 08 Identity Security's Bright Future
- 09 Conclusion(s)

Enter: Single Sign On


Single Sign On (SSO): one key to unlock multiple doors

SSO itself is the process that allows a single authentication to be used across multiple web sites or applications


Note: you can have federation without SSO, but you cannot have SSO w/o federation

SSO w/ Dot1X Supplicant

- Leverages the login to the local OS
 - Sends those same credentials into the network for 802.1X authentication



SSO [somewhat] Explained



SSO principles

- AuthN One Time
 - Each app uses the same AuthN, performs AuthZ locally
- Tries to use existing auth
 - If no existing, will send user for authentication

Note: the fact that the app is still still doing local AuthZ shows federation.

Demo Video: Single Sign On with Duo



Recycle Bin




Google
Chrome



Microsoft
Edge



Webex



Search



Agenda

- 01 Introduction
- 02 History & AAA
- 03 Enter: Single-Sign-On
- 04 SAML
- 05 OAuth & OIDC
- 06 WebAuthN & Passkeys
- 07 Gotcha's
- 08 Identity Security's Bright Future
- 09 Conclusion(s)

**Enter:
Security Assertion
Markup Language
(SAML)**

Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)

- Open Standard (OASIS Consortium)
 - v2 is most common, standardized back in 2005
 - Allows the SSO product to pass credentials to applications, so a single credential can be used across many web sites / apps
 - Uses XML for the data

The XACML working group had to find something to do with their stuff 😊

Definitions

Web-based
Auth's



Browser
aka: User Agent

Acts as the “client”. Each AuthN session is stored per-UserAgent (ex: Outlook, Chrome, Safari, etc.)

Like combo of supplicant & authenticator in dot1x.



Service
Provider (SP)



IdP



Directory

802.1X



Supplicant



Authenticator



Authentication
Server



Directory

Definitions

Web-based
Auth's



Browser
aka: User Agent



Service
Provider (SP)

The application that needs to be
logged into.

(ex: ServiceNow, Salesforce, etc.)

Like the Authenticator in dot1x



IdP



Directory

802.1X



Supplicant



Authenticator



Authentication
Server



Directory

Definitions

Web-based
Auth's



Browser
aka: User Agent



Service
Provider (SP)



IdP



Directory

Handles the authentication, issues
assertion, etc.

(ex: PING, EntraID, Shibboleth, etc.)

Like the Authentication Server in dot1x

802.1X



Supplicant



Authenticator



Authentication
Server



Directory

Definitions

Web-based
Auth's



Browser
aka: User Agent



Service
Provider (SP)



IdP



Directory

The ID store. Could be built into the IdP or could be separate (like AD).
(ex: AD, LDAP, JDBC, etc.)

Same as the ID Store with dot1x

802.1X



Supplicant



Authenticator



Authentication
Server




Directory

Sessions & Cookies


For the non-Web Developer

- Web Apps use HTTP
 - HTTP is transactional, but not stateful
 - An HTTP Request is made, response is sent, comm is over
- Cookies are used to maintain state
 - Session ID & other useful information for the website
 - Once the user clears their cache, the cookies are often deleted
- Each session is associated with a randomly generated unique ID
 - Website sends the cookie to the browser
 - Stored in the browser's local cache
 - Used in all future transactions to identify the state to the web app




Note: *The web service does not retain a copy. It does not compare the client's cookie to what the service sent.*


SAML for Single-Sign-On




SAML for Single-Sign-On




The Beer Drinker's Guide to SAML



The Beer Drinker's Guide to SAML



The Beer Drinker's Guide to SAML



IDP vs. SP Initiated Login


IdP Initiated Login

Centralized App Launch Location – end-user logs in to the central portal with SSO.

Clicks one of the tiles & is directed to the SP (application) with the token "in-hand".

Preferred when a simplified user-experience is desired w/ a single place to access all the applications.


Examples: **Security Cloud Sign-on** & **Duo Central**



SP Initiated Login

Application triggered login – when logging into the application itself, the end-user is redirected to the IdP for authentication.

Examples: **CII** & **Webex**



Configuring SAML

SAML requires copy/pasting values between the IDP and the SP

IDP Configuration

IDP Entity ID

The unique URL on the IDP to identify this configured app

Single Sign-On-URL

The unique URL for the SP to redirect the user-agent (browser) to for logins to this app to start SSO

Single-Log-Out-URL (optional)

If the IDP supports logout process, this is the URL to redirect clients to

Metadata URL (optional)

Sometimes the IDP will offer each of these fields within an XML document and publish it to make it easy for the SP to get these values instead of Copy/Paste

SP Configuration

SP Entity ID

The unique URL on the SP to identify the app

Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) URL

The unique URL for the sso-subsystem on the SP for the user-agent to send the IDPs assertion to.

Configuring SAML

SAML requires copy/pasting values between the IDP and the SP

IDP Configuration

SP Configuration

They must also exchange their own X.509 certificate.

- Building Trust Relationship between IDP & SP
 - Securing the Communications (*i.e: TLS)
 - Signing the Assertions
 - Encrypting SAML messages

Agenda

- 01 Introduction
- 02 History & AAA
- 03 Enter: Single-Sign-On
- 04 SAML
- 05 OAuth & OIDC
- 06 WebAuthN & Passkeys
- 07 Gotcha's
- 08 Identity Security's Bright Future
- 09 Conclusion(s)


Open Authorization (OAuth)

OAuth 2.0 is a security standard where you give **one application** permission to access your data in **another application**

Open Authorization v2 (OAuth2)

- Open Standard
 - Token exchange protocol
 - Designed for **application to application, authorized by a user.**
 - User authorizes the application.
 - IdP issues a token (JSON Web Token [JWT]) to the app
 - Allows the app to make API calls on behalf of the user.

OAuth Flow



Example of Consent

 Sign in with Google



Sign in to Cisco Webex Social Login

L loxx@securitydemo.net ▾

By continuing, Google will share your name, email address, language preference, and profile picture with Cisco Webex Social Login. See Cisco Webex Social Login's [Privacy Policy](#) and [Terms of Service](#).

You can manage Sign in with Google in your [Google Account](#).

Cancel

Continue

English (United States) ▾

[Help](#) [Privacy](#) [Terms](#)

Open ID Connect (OIDC)

OIDC is a thin layer that sits **on top** of OAuth 2.0 to add login and profile information about the user into the exchange. This transforms the exchange to add authentication to OAuth2's **authorization!**

OIDC is now an alternative
to SAML for **SSO**.

OAuth is App to App
AuthZ.

OIDC Glossary



- **Relying Party (RP)** – This is the application that Lee is logging into! It is the **same as an SP in SAML**.
- **Resource Owner** – This is **authorizing user**. They own their ID, data, and control actions performed on their account.
- **Client** – The technical component of the the application that wants to access data or perform actions on behalf of the Resource Owner. It is **the public ID of the RP**.
- **IDP** – Responsible for **AuthN of users** and issuing an ID Token providing the identity info to the Relying Party.
- **Authorization Server** – Very often this is also the IDP, but it can be separated. It is an application that knows the **Resource Owner** and where the Resource Owner already has an account. This is also called an **OpenID Provider** in OIDC
- **Resource Server** – An API or service that the client wants to use on behalf of the resource owner. This will sometimes be the same provider as the Authorization Server

Configuring OIDC

Minimum Fields

OIDC requires entering values from the IDP into the RP

Client ID

Unique ID created by the IDP. Is the identifier for the Relying Party & acts like a username for auth

Client Secret

A secret between the RP & the IDP, it acts like the password for the auth between the RP & IDP

Issuer

Like the Entity ID from SAML. The unique URL on the IDP to identify this configured app

Authorization URL

Specific URL on the IDP for AuthN/Z comms

Token URL

URL on the IDP for the RP to obtain an access token

JWKS URL

URL on the IDP containing the keys the RP uses to validate the IDPs signatures

UserInfo URL

The RP presents a token to this URL to retrieve claims

Token Introspection URL

RP uses this URL to validate access tokens. Kind of like an OCSP service in PKI.

Discovery URL


Like the MetaData URL in SAML. It's the openid-configuration JSON file with all these attributes in it

OIDC versus SAML



- SAML is older than OIDC.
 - SAML transmits user attributes using XML format and browser redirects
 - While OIDC uses JSON format and communicates directly from the client application to the OpenID Provider.
- OIDC is considered to be more secure*
 - Enables complete machine-to-machine authentication.
- Which should you choose?
 - Often won't have a choice as not many application vendors implement both!
 - OIDC is being increasingly common for new integrations.

**Depending on which grant type is being used*



Agenda

- 01 Introduction
- 02 History & AAA
- 03 Enter: Single-Sign-On
- 04 SAML
- 05 OAuth & OIDC
- 06 WebAuthN & Passkeys
- 07 Gotcha's
- 08 Identity Security's Bright Future
- 09 Conclusion(s)

Authentication Factors

The Evolution

Authentication Factors:


- Something you Are
- Something you Know
- Something you have

Multi-Factor AuthN (MFA):

- Means more than One

Assurance Levels:

- How good is the AuthN?
- Is SMS as reliable and strong as a YubiKey?



Web Authentication (WebAuthN)

Web Authentication (WebAuthN)

This is what enables passkeys

- An API websites use to talk to web browsers
- An API spec for accessing public key credentials
- Developed by FIDO Alliance, ratified by the W3C
- Manages both registration and authentication
- Can be used for primary or secondary authentication




[WebAuthn.io](https://webauthn.io)

FIDO2 Authentication



- Developed by FIDO alliance
- WebAuthN + Client to Authenticator Protocol v2 (CTAP2)
- CTAP: API for browser to authenticator communication
- Can be used for MFA or password-less



Certificate Authentication Refresher

Because this is SOO Similar


When the authentication server is presented with an identity certificate, it will perform the following tasks (at a minimum):

1. Has the Digital Certificate been issued and properly signed by a known and trusted certificate authority?
2. Is the Certificate Expired? – Must check both the issue and expiration dates!
3. Has the Certificate been revoked by the certificate authority?
4. Has the client provided proof of possession?




Passkeys

- Passkeys are essentially just a new (and easier) name for WebAuthn + FIDO2 credentials
- Passkeys, however, don't have to just be device bound
- Shared passkeys make things a whole lot easier for end users
 - Credentials can be synced using secure methods (icloud keychain/passwords app, Google password manager, etc)
- There 'may' be security concerns with sharing.... Think personal icloud account across possibly work AND personal device
- AND...



Shared Passkeys



Airdrop!

To ANYONE!

Agenda

- 01 Introduction
- 02 History & AAA
- 03 Enter: Single-Sign-On
- 04 SAML
- 05 OAuth & OIDC
- 06 WebAuthN & Passkeys
- 07 Gotcha's
- 08 Identity Security's Bright Future
- 09 Conclusion(s)

Gotcha's
(it's not all Sunshine & Roses)

Back in My Day



RADIUS Did it All!

Long Live the King: RADIUS

- With RADIUS: there was structure:
- Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs)
 - i.e.: User-Name: [username]
- The RADIUS server knew what to expect
- It could be extended with Vendor Specific Attributes (VSAs).

```
▼ Attribute Value Pairs
  ▷ AVP: l=24  t=User-Name(1): host/winxp.example.com
  ▷ AVP: l=6   t=Service-Type(6): Framed(2)
  ▷ AVP: l=6   t=Framed-IP-Address(8): 192.168.2.100
  ▷ AVP: l=6   t=Framed-MTU(12): 1500
  ▷ AVP: l=19  t=Called-Station-Id(30): 00-1A-A2-7E-7F-03
  ▷ AVP: l=19  t=Calling-Station-Id(31): 00-16-D4-2E-E8-BA
  ▷ AVP: l=89  t=EAP-Message(79) Last Segment[1]
  ▷ AVP: l=18  t=Message-Authenticator(80): 1a71a57045f7ea6
  ▷ AVP: l=2   t=EAP-Key-Name(102):
  ▷ AVP: l=49  t=Vendor-Specific(26) v=Cisco(9)
  ▷ AVP: l=6   t=NAS-Port-Type(61): Ethernet(15)
  ▷ AVP: l=6   t=NAS-Port(5): 50001
  ▷ AVP: l=17  t=NAS-Port-Id(87): FastEthernet0/1
  ▷ AVP: l=74  t=State(24): 333743504d536573736966f6e49443d4
  ▷ AVP: l=6   t=NAS-IP-Address(4): 192.168.1.60
```

SAML / OAuth

- SAML & OAuth: part of the Token but can have many different schemas
- Must program each side to know what field is
- Dictate the schema via URL
 - Ex: Use “email” as username
 - Defined in the metadata

! – Example: XDR UI App OAuth Token

```
{
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/user/email": "loxx@securitydemo.net",
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/user/idp/id": "sxso",
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/user/nick": "Aaron Woland",
  "email": "loxx@securitydemo.net",
  "aud": [
    "iroh-ui",
    "login"
  ],
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/user/role": "admin",
  "sub": "9992027f-a88b-4b0e-8a38-58ad317c58af",
  "iss": "IROH Auth",
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/scopes": [
    "event:read",
    "cisco/feature-flag/xdr",
    "insights",
    "vault/configs:read",
    "integration",
    "private-intel",
    "admin",
    "profile",
    "inspect",
    "asset",
    "ao"
  ],
  "exp": 1731003921,
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/oauth/client/name": "Threat Response",
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/oauth/user/id": "9992027f-a88b-4b0e-8a38-58ad317c58af",
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/org/id": "2e0e9eaf-eaf7-4449-9c07-9fb1828aec78",
  "https://schemas.cisco.com/iroh/identity/claims/oauth/grant": "login",
  ! – SNIP
}
```

Lack of Standards / Easy Behaviors

Example is Auth0, a CIAM

Integrating to a SAML IdP, it requires me to write this mapping out manually.

- Define which schema to figure out email.
- Define which attribute to use to find groups.

The screenshot shows the Cisco Duo SSO configuration interface. At the top, there's a 'Back to SAML' link. Below it, the configuration is for 'Aaron's Duo SSO' with a SAML Identifier 'con_aRGGNZCr9ZENiCFz'. A navigation bar includes 'Settings', 'Provisioning', 'Mappings' (which is selected), 'IdP-Initiated SSO', 'Login Experience', 'Setup', and 'Applications'. The main content area explains that these are the attributes in the SAML token mapped to user properties in Auth0. It provides two mapping options: 'Simple mapping' and 'Multiple options mapping'. A code block shows a JSON example for the simple mapping. At the bottom, there's a 'Show full mappings example' link and a 'Save Changes' button.

← Back to SAML

 **Aaron's Duo SSO**
SAML Identifier `con_aRGGNZCr9ZENiCFz`

Settings Provisioning **Mappings** IdP-Initiated SSO Login Experience Setup Applications

These are the attributes in the SAML token that will be mapped to the user properties in Auth0. The format of the mappings are:

- **Simple mapping:** "auth0_user_attribute": "incoming_saml_attribute"
- **Multiple options mapping:** "auth0_user_attribute": ["incoming_saml_attribute1", "incoming_saml_attribute2", "etc."]

```
1 {  
2   "email": "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/nameidentifier",  
3   "groups": "memberOf"  
4 }
```

[Show full mappings example](#)

[Save Changes](#)

Lack of Standards / Easy Behaviors

- Can get REALLY complex
 - This shows a powerful, but complex IDP
 - Each & everything is customizable
 - There aren't really any preconfigured drop downs, etc..

The screenshot displays the 'SP Connections' configuration page in the Cisco Duo Admin Center. The interface is divided into a left sidebar with navigation links (Integration, SP Connections, SP Applications, Target URL Mapping, SP Default URL, Policy Content, Adapter Mapping) and a main content area. The main area is titled 'SP Connections | SP Connection' and includes tabs for 'Connection Type', 'Connection Options', 'Metadata URL', 'General Info', 'Summary', 'Activation & Summary', and 'Troubleshooting'. The 'Summary' tab is active, showing a table of configuration details for a SAML 2.0 connection. The table is organized into sections: 'Connection Type', 'Connection Options', 'General Info', 'SAML Profiles', 'Assertion Lifetime', 'Identity Mapping', 'Attribute Mapping', 'Authentication Source Mapping', 'Assertion Consumer Service URL', 'Allowable SAML Bindings', 'Signature Policy', and 'Encryption Policy'. Each section contains a list of settings with their current values. For example, under 'Connection Type', 'Connection Type' is 'SP' and 'Connection Name' is 'SP Connection'. Under 'SAML Profiles', 'SP-Initiated SSO' is 'True'. Under 'Identity Mapping', 'Subject Name Format' is 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress'. The bottom of the page has 'Cancel', 'Previous', and 'Save' buttons.

Section	Setting	Value
Connection Type	Connection Type	SP
	Connection Name	SP Connection
	Connection ID	SP Connection
Connection Options	SP-Initiated SSO	True
	SP-Initiated SLO	True
	SP-Initiated SSO	True
	SP-Initiated SLO	True
General Info	Metadata URL	https://example.com/metadata/SPConnection.xml
	Metadata URL	https://example.com/metadata/SPConnection.xml
SAML Profiles	SP-Initiated SSO	True
	SP-Initiated SLO	True
	SP-Initiated SSO	True
	SP-Initiated SLO	True
Assertion Lifetime	Assertion Lifetime	1
	Assertion Lifetime	1
Identity Mapping	Subject Name Format	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Subject Name Format	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
Attribute Mapping	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
Authentication Source Mapping	Adapter Instance Name	SP Connection
	Adapter Instance Name	SP Connection
Mapping Method	Mapping Method	Use only the Adapter Instance Name in the mapping
	Mapping Method	Use only the Adapter Instance Name in the mapping
Attribute Mapping	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
	Attribute	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
Assertion Consumer Service URL	Assertion Consumer Service URL	https://example.com/acs/SPConnection
	Assertion Consumer Service URL	https://example.com/acs/SPConnection
Allowable SAML Bindings	Artifact	True
	Artifact	True
	Artifact	True
	Artifact	True
Signature Policy	Require digitally signed AuthN requests	True
	Require digitally signed AuthN requests	True
Encryption Policy	Require digitally signed AuthN requests	True
	Require digitally signed AuthN requests	True
Digital Signature Settings	Digital Signature Settings	Require digitally signed AuthN requests
	Digital Signature Settings	Require digitally signed AuthN requests

Lack of Standards / Easy Behaviors

Some Vendors try to make it easier (ahem: Duo)

- Supported schemas are selectable via a drop down.
- Change our UI to represent the naming convention on the integrated app

Optional: When set, all IdP-initiated requests include this relaystate. Configure if instructed by your service provider.

SAML Response

NameID format *

The format that specifies how the NameID is sent to the service provider.

NameID attribute *

NameID is a SAML attribute that identifies the user. Enter an IdP attribute or select a bridge attribute that automatically chooses the NameID attribute based on the IdP. Create custom attributes by clicking the plus icon. Supported attributes: <Email Address>, <Username>, <First Name>, <Last Name>, <Display Name>.

Signature algorithm *

Signature encryption algorithm used in the SAML assertion and response.

Signing options * ☒ Sign response ☒ Sign assertion


Choose at least one option for signing the SAML response. Your service provider will use these to verify the response's authenticity.

Assertion encryption ☐ Encrypt the SAML assertion

Change of Authorization (CoA)

Described in **RFC 3576** and its successor **RFC 5176**

- Allows RADIUS server to disconnect or force other change in the authorization status of a user/endpoint.
- Disconnect
- Port-bounce
- Re-Authenticate
- Apply ACL



Continuous Authorization Evaluation Protocol (CAEP)

- Designed for real-time access control adjustments
 - i.e: Change of Authorization
- Meant to overcome the AuthN once & AuthZ until token expires problem

Shared Signals


- Enables sharing of security-related information across different services or systems
 - Kind of like STIX, but not.
 - Because we have to re-invent everything in Web AAA
- Used with CAEP for identity-related security events

Requires Human Interaction

- SAML, OAuth & OIDC
 - Are interactive
 - Require someone to click objects, or input usernames to obtain the token.
 - Makes coding scripts more tricky
 - Think: Python script to automate certain actions
 - Once you have the Token it's easy, but how do you get it via script?





Last piece of the puzzle

Login Once, Access Everything Securely






	Interactive authentication - end user friction
	Authentication brokered through device, Duo, and Duo Desktop

Duo Passport – True SSO



Duo Passport – True SSO





Recycle Bin




Google
Chrome




Microsoft
Edge



Webex



Search



Agenda

- 01 Introduction
- 02 History & AAA
- 03 Enter: Single-Sign-On
- 04 SAML
- 05 OAuth & OIDC
- 06 WebAuthN & Passkeys
- 07 Gotcha's
- 08 Identity Security's Bright Future
- 09 Conclusion(s)

“Future is so bright, I gotta wear shades”



Verifiable Credentials – Why?


“

**“The electric light did not come
from the continuous improvement
of candles.”**

Oren Harari


Is your new hire who they say they are?

- Issuing credentials to the bad-actors is a GREAT way for them to gain access to your data
 - “*Why hack in when I can log in?*”
- Helpdesk impersonation attacks
 - Successful Phishing Attack:
 - Stolen office session cookie
 - Password harvested off the dark-web
 - Bad guy has access to your email
 - Call into the helpdesk, need to add a new MFA device
 - Now the bad-guy has his own authenticator for valid MFA
- This happens ALL THE TIME



Duo Identity Verification integration

- Introducing IDV workflows during critical moments in the workforce user's lifecycle
- First phase is a partnership with Persona. This partner was chosen for:
 - Flexibility and broad options
 - Global support
 - Strategic alignment with Cisco & Duo
- Key workflows:
 - Help Desk Verification
 - Remote Onboarding
 - Self-Service




To establish trust, users must match information that has been stored in Duo – then provide government ID and a selfie.

Helpdesk Identity Verification


That was **Identity
Verification (IDV)**.

Coming soon is
**Verifiable Credentials
with Digital ID's**

Jill onboards at ACME - Today




Jill onboards at ACME – Tomorrow



More Future Goodness

Non-Human Identity (NHI)





This is NOT NEW! Seems that the industry just woke-up to it!

- Humans aren't the only entities with identities
 - Machine Identities.
 - Workload Identities.
- For example, look at the Webex rooms & do they have “LoxxBot” in them?
- Is an agent/bot that acts with API keys tied to me as a human.
- Like services accounts.
 - They have so many permissions – do we know which human to tie those service accounts to?

NHI Dashboard

- CII Identifies Non-Human Identities
 - Service Accounts (where possible)
 - Attempts to Identify Risks
- Offers direct download of reports related to NHI's from the Dashboard
 - These require deeper queries into the system & are then offered as CSV Exports



NHI Reports Available for Download

Accounts Sharing Access Devices [Download](#)

This report displays accounts that have shared access to a device, which could indicate credential sharing. Such instances should be investigated or cleaned up. A device is considered shared if more than one user has registered it and there has been successful activity on it within the last 30 days.


Agentic Applications Presence [Download](#)

This report displays a list of agentic applications and the successful access hits within the range defined by the application usage detection settings.

Human Use of Non-Human Identities [Download](#)

Provides a list of human accounts that are suspected of using non-human identities through the same device in the last 30 days to identify NHI misuse.

Cannot have a preso today without mentioning “AI” 😊




Agentic AI – where AI agents are acting on behalf of humans.

- Think about OAuth. A human can authorize an agent to act, with their level of permissions and rights.
- How do I know if Aaron did this, or if an Agent did this on behalf of Aaron.


New Vocabulary Terms for AI

- MCP – Model Context Protocol
 - The MCP Server knows about the APIs or other resources it is programmed for.
 - When an MCP Client (agent) is looking for information / answers, it can look into any of the LLMs it is connected to but also can query the MCP Servers for the types of information they can answer.
 - Connects AI to the outside world: It allows AI models to access things like databases, APIs (Application Programming Interfaces), file systems, and other applications.
 - Enables AI to perform actions: This means AI agents can do more than just generate text; they can retrieve specific data, send emails, create calendar events, manage code, or even control network devices.

MCP Comms & Components in a Nutshell



MCP Comms & Components in a Nutshell



Extending Authorization for an Agentic AI World

- OAuth 2.1 Enhances Security for Agentic AI
 - Removes insecure Grant Types
 - Mandates PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) – ensuring only the client that initiated the request can exchange the code for a token
 - Requires exact matching of redirect URIs (no wildcards or partial matches) to prevent attacks where malicious URIs are used
 - Removes Long-Lived Token Support, pushing for Refresh Token Rotation after every use
 - Used for centralized authorization
- SPIFFE (Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone)
 - Each workload gets a unique Cryptographic ID (Certificate or JWT)
 - A SPIFFE ID is a standardized format for identifying workloads. It looks like: `spiffe://trust-domain/workload-path`.
 - The “trust domain” defines a group of workloads that trust each other (e.g., a company’s infrastructure).
 - Meant for workload-to-workload distributed auth
- SPIRE (SPIFFE Runtime Environment)
 - Reference implementation of SPIFFE

Identity Governance and Administration (IGA)

- IGA is the central point where entitlements (who can access what) are managed
- Managing entitlements has both security and compliance impact

Cookie-less SSO

- Session Hijacking is a real attack vector
 - Bad guy sits between user & SP (the app)
 - App sends user the cookie
 - Bad guy copies those cookies & now uses the cookie to access the app “as the user”
- Removing cookies from the process, session hijacking becomes thing of the past
 - Duo will have cookie-less SSO w/ Duo Passport

Agenda

- 01 Introduction
- 02 History & AAA
- 03 Enter: Single-Sign-On
- 04 SAML
- 05 OAuth & OIDC
- 06 WebAuthN & Passkeys
- 07 Gotcha's
- 08 Identity Security's Bright Future
- 09 Conclusion(s)

Conclusion(s)

Conclusions

- AAA is a basic security principle that is just as relevant today as it was 20 years ago.
- SAML & OIDC are for Single Sign On, while OAuth is for Application Authorization
- WebAuthN is more than just webauth in networking
- Passkeys are here, Passwordless is here – use them, but keep an eye to the future w/ Verifiable Credentials
- Duo makes Identity Easy and Secure
- You had fun in this session, even though the topic is boring

Good Links

- Shibboleth Consortium: <https://www.shibboleth.net/index/>
- OASIS: <https://www.oasis-open.org>
- Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML: <https://duo.com/blog/the-beer-drinkers-guide-to-saml>
- Fighting Cookie Theft: <https://blog.chromium.org/2024/04/fighting-cookie-theft-using-device.html>
- A demo of Webauthn and Passkeys: <https://webauthn.io>
- How Certificate Authentication Works: <https://blog.woland.com/2014/03/03/how-does-certificate-based-authentication-actually-work/>

Complete your session evaluations



Complete a minimum of 4 session surveys and the Overall Event Survey to claim a Cisco Live T-Shirt.



Earn up to 800 points by completing all surveys and climb the Cisco Live Challenge leaderboard.



Level up and earn exclusive prizes!



Complete your surveys in the Cisco Live Events app.

Continue your education



Visit the Cisco Stand for related demos



Book your one-on-one Meet the Expert meeting



Attend the interactive education with Capture the Flag, and Walk-in Labs



Visit the On-Demand Library for more sessions at www.CiscoLive.com/on-demand

Contact me at: Insert preferred comms method

Please fill out the Survey



If there is anything we can improve, please let us know!

Thank you

CISCO Live !

