



Cisco *live!*

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Designing Layer 2 Networks – Avoiding Loops, Drops, Flooding

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BRKCRS-2661

Cisco Spark




Questions?

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Agenda

- L2 Network Design Challenges
- Layer 1 and Layer 2 Best Practices
- Spanning Tree Toolkit
- Integrated Security Toolkit
- Control Plane Protection
- Alternative Designs

Presentation Legend



Key Points



Reference Material



Standalone Multilayer Switch



Virtual Switching System




Layer 2 Link




Layer 3 Link

L2 Network Design Challenges

Traditional Multi-Layer Design – No L2 Loops




Traditional Multi-Layer Design – No L2 Loops



One switch per
subnet, per VLAN


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Simple design ✓

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
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
Limits L2 broadcast domain size to the size of the access switch

Traditional Multi-Layer Design – With L2 Loops

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Traditional Multi-Layer Design – With L2 Loops




Extending the L2 domain beyond the single switch

Best practice says

- Distribution link must be an L2 link
- Redundant Links


Now we have the loop

L2 Loop – What's the Problem?



- Broadcast and multicast storm
- Source MAC address appear to be moving around as the MAC gets learned on different ports
- Frames are replicated repeatedly


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L2 Loops and the Effect of Frame Replication on Interface Bandwidth

Broadcast Traffic Rate on a Port



Effects of a Broadcast Storm

Control Plane Saturation

- Bandwidth gets consumed due to frame replication
- CPU utilisation of network attached devices can start to reach high levels due to processing the broadcast traffic
- Network Instability
 - MAC addresses move from one port another
 - Traffic drops due to bandwidth oversubscription
 - This can occur with broadcast , multicast and unknown unicast traffic

Causes of Loops and Broadcast Storms

- Malfunctioning NIC's
- OS /software problems
- Oversubscribed network devices
- Additional devices added unexpectedly (switches, APs)
- Human error
- Malicious activity
- Others...

A red rectangular sign with the word "CLOSED" in large, white, bold, sans-serif capital letters. The sign is mounted on a glass surface, likely a door, using two silver metal clips. A green rope is visible hanging from the top of the door frame. The background is blurred, showing an interior space with shelves and other items.

CLOSED




Solution: Mitigate Vulnerabilities & Harden the Network

- Layer 1 Best Practices
- Layer 2 Best Practices
- Spanning Tree Protocol Best Practices
- Harden the control plane

“Make the network fail closed”


Layer 1 and Layer 2 Best Practices

- Fibre links versus copper
- Point to point links
- Storm control
- Vlan Trunking Protocol (VTP)
- Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP)
- Unidirectional Link Detection (UDLD)



Reduce Link Down Detection Time


Use Fibre Links Versus Copper Links Whenever Possible



Reduce Link Down Detection Time

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Direct point-to-point fibre provides for fast failure detection




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- Bit D13 in the Fast Link Pulse (FLP) can be set to indicate a physical fault to the remote side



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
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- **copper linecard is 300 msec**



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
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

Carrier-delay

- Default 10 microseconds is adequate for most applications





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- Eliminate or avoid at all cost intermediate L1 devices
- Can Mask link failures
- Use point-to-point link only



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
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L1 Fibre or Copper Extender


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Storm Control / Traffic Suppression

Use hardware-based rate-limiting to protect and harden the broadcast domain



Limit broadcast, multicast and unknown unicast to a specific rate

- 1 sec sample interval

The rate-limiter will drop all profiled traffic above the threshold rate during the sample period

- All profile traffic including legitimate traffic

Determining Typical Storm Control Rates

- Take some time to monitor bcast, mcast rates under normal conditions
 - Use Top N tools (if available on the platform)
 - Netflow monitoring
 - Interface counters and SNMP tools
 - Wire Shark monitoring

Example using Top N reports on Catalyst 6500

```
VSS01#collect top counters interface ten sort-by broadcast interval 30
TopN collection started.
VSS01#
*Mar  6 16:58:18.735: %TOPN_COUNTERS-SW2-5-STARTED: TopN collection for report 1 started by console
```

Show Top Reports Example

```
VSS01#collect top counters interface tenGigabitEthernet sort-by broadcast  
interval 30
```

```
VSS01# show top counters interface report 1
```

```
Started By      : console  
Start Time     : 16:58:18 UTC Thu Mar 6 2014  
End Time       : 16:58:48 UTC Thu Mar 6 2014  
Port Type      : TenGigEthernet  
Sort By        : broadcast  
Interval       : 30 seconds
```

Port	Band width	Util	Bytes (Tx + Rx)	Packets (Tx + Rx)	Broadcast (Tx + Rx)	Multicast (Tx + Rx)	In- err	Buf- ovfl
Te1/2/4	10000	0	21559	151	9	142	0	0
Te2/2/4	10000	0	21559	151	9	142	0	0
Te1/2/5	10000	0	18256	140	1	137	0	0
Te2/1/5	10000	0	18160	139	1	137	0	0
Te2/4/1	10000	0	168	2	0	0	0	0
Te1/4/4	10000	9	7072412223	17148485	0	3	0	0
Te2/4/5	10000	0	168	2	0	0	0	0
Te1/4/3	10000	9	7072658842	17148739	0	3	0	0
Te1/4/2	10000	0	6496	82	0	82	0	0
Te1/4/8	10000	0	168	2	0	0	0	0

RMON History Example

```
C3850#show rmon history
```

```
Entry 30 is active, and owned by  
Monitors ifIndex.27 every 15 second(s)  
Requested # of time intervals, ie buckets, is 30,  
Sample # 8 began measuring at 3w4d  
Received 128 octets, 0 packets,  
0 broadcast and 0 multicast packets,  
0 undersized and 0 oversized packets,  
0 fragments and 0 jabbers,  
0 CRC alignment errors and 0 collisions.  
# of dropped packet events is 0  
Network utilization is estimated at 0  
Sample # 9 began measuring at 3w4d  
Received 460 octets, 0 packets,  
0 broadcast and 4 multicast packets,  
0 undersized and 0 oversized packets,  
0 fragments and 0 jabbers,  
0 CRC alignment errors and 0 collisions.  
# of dropped packet events is 0  
Network utilization is estimated at 0  
Sample # 10 began measuring at 3w4d  
Received 949 octets, 0 packets,  
0 broadcast and 2 multicast packets,  
0 undersized and 0 oversized packets,  
0 fragments and 0 jabbers,
```

RMON History Example on Catalyst 3850



Storm Control Recommendations

Based on your network metrics, choose a value that will allow for peak Broadcast, multicast, unknown unicast plus 50%

- 1% bcast rate is common for 1GbE interfaces
- 0.5% is a common rate for 10GbE interfaces

The higher the interface speed the less the percentage needs to be


Be very cautious when configuring storm control for multicast frames, as this can limit BPDUs

Verify platform specific support and caveats

- Some platforms treat traffic types individually, some will group bcast and mcast together
- Some legacy hardware do not support storm-control or implement software-based mechanisms

IEEE802.1Q Trunk Interfaces

- Typically deployed on interconnection between access and distribution layers
- Used to extend multiple VLANs between L2 switches
- **Should I use** or how to use the Vlan Trunking Protocol?
- **Should I use** or how to use the Dynamic Trunking Protocol?




Vlan Trunking Protocol (VTP)

Vlan Trunking Protocol (VTP) - used to maintain Vlan configuration consistency across a given domain of switches

- VLAN configurations are made at the VTP server
- VLAN configuration is propagated via VTP protocols to client switches
- Intended to minimise misconfigurations and inconsistencies

**L2/L3
Distribution**




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
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
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
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
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Vlan Trunking Protocol (VTP) Recommendations


- Weigh the benefits and drawbacks of deploying VTP for your organisation
- VTP Transparent mode is suitable for majority of current campus deployments
 - Promotes use of stringent change control processes
 - Eliminates/creates some possibilities for misconfigurations
 - Coupled with manual VLAN pruning can minimise extensive use of virtual port resources





Vlan Trunking Protocol (VTP) Recommendations

- Configure VTP mode transparent
 - Router(config)# vtp mode transparent
- Change the native VLAN to something unused to avoid VLAN hopping
 - Router (config) # switchport trunk native vlan 999
- Manually prune all VLANS except those needed to the downstream switch



Dynamic Trunking Protocol

DTP is an Layer 2 protocol that negotiates configuration parameters between a switch port and its neighbour.


- Encapsulation type
- Native VLAN
- Hardware capability

DTP ensures that ports and their neighbours are in consistent states.

- also helps protect against the flooding of tagged frames by non-trunk ports
- potentially a serious security risk

DTP Dynamic Trunk Protocol

- Automatic formation of trunked switch-to-switch interconnection
 - **Trunk**: always be a trunk
 - **Desirable**: ask if the other side can/will
 - **Auto**: if the other side asks I will
 - **Access**: don't become a trunk
- Negotiation of 802.1Q or ISL encapsulation
 - **ISL**: try to use ISL trunk encapsulation
 - **802.1q**: try to use 802.1q encapsulation
 - **Negotiate**: negotiate ISL or 802.1q encapsulation with peer
 - **Non-negotiate**: always use encapsulation that is hard set



Switchport Mode Command Options

Mode	DTP Frames Transmitted ?	Final State ? (local port)
Dynamic Auto	Yes, periodic	Trunking, if far side requests
Trunk	Yes, periodic	Trunking, unconditionally
Nonegotiate	No	Trunking, unconditionally
Dynamic desirable	Yes, periodic	It ends up in trunking state only if the remote mode is on, auto, or desirable.
Access	No, in steady state, but transmits informs in order to speed up remote-end detection after a change from on.	Non-trunking

Optimising Convergence: Trunk Tuning


Trunk Auto/Desirable Takes Some Time

Tuning DTP with “nonegotiate” improves link up convergence time

```
IOS(config-if)# switchport mode trunk
IOS(config-if)# switchport nonegotiate
```



Time to Converge in
Seconds






Trunking/VTP/DTP - Quick Summary


- VTP transparent should be used; there is a trade off between administrative overhead and the temptation to span existing VLANS across multiple access layer switches
- One can consider a configuration that uses DTP ON/ON and NO NEGOTIATE; there is a trade off between performance/HA impact and maintenance and operations implications
- An ON/ON and NO NEGOTIATE configuration is faster from a link up (restoration) perspective than a desirable/desirable alternative. However, in this configuration DTP is not actively monitoring the state of the trunk and a misconfigured trunk is not easily identified
- It's really a balance between fast convergence and your ability to manage configuration and change control ...

Unidirectional Links

- Example topology where a uni-directional can cause an L2 loop
- If SW3 stops receiving BPDUs from SW2, SW3 will change its Blocking Port to Forwarding after STP timeout




Unidirectional Link Detection Protocol (UDLD)




- UDLD works by exchanging protocol packets between the neighbouring devices.
- Both devices on the link must support UDLD and have it enabled on respective ports.
- UDLD protocol packets contain the port's own device/port ID, and the neighbour's device/port IDs seen by UDLD on that port. Neighbouring ports should see their own device/port ID (echo) in the packets received from the other side.

UDLD Aggressive and UDLD Normal




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
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
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
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 - Use `errdisable recovery` configuration to automate recovery

Best Practices - UDLD Configuration


- Typically deployed on any fibre optic interconnection
- **Use UDLD aggressive mode with caution**
 - Ensure an out-of-band console connection to the device in then event that an err-disabled port will cut-off in-band management
 - Err-disable recovery method
 - Use Automated
- Turn on in global configuration to avoid operational error/misses
- Config example
 - Cisco IOS:
`udld enable`
 - Enables UDLD globally on fibre-optic LAN ports.
- Make sure UDLD timers will expire before the STP convergence = $\text{Maxage} + 2 \times \text{Forward Delay time}$




Spanning Tree Toolkit

Multilayer Network Design

Layer 2 Access with Layer 3 Distribution




- Each access switch has unique VLANs
- No Layer 2 loops
- Layer 3 link between distribution
- No blocked links



- At least some VLANs span multiple access switches
- Layer 2 loops
- Layer 2 and 3 running over link between distribution
- Blocked links

Spanning Tree Protocol Options


- Rapid-PVST+ greatly improves the restoration times for any VLAN that requires a topology convergence due to link UP
- PVST+ (IEEE 802.1d)
 - Traditional spanning tree implementation
- Rapid PVST+ (IEEE 802.1w)
 - Scales to large size (~10,000 logical ports)
 - **Easy to implement, proven, scales**
 - **Default STP mode in current IOS releases**
- MST (IEEE 802.1s)
 - Permits very large scale STP implementations (~30,000 logical ports)
 - **Not as flexible as rapid PVST+**



Optimising the Layer 2 Design

STP Toolkit – PortFast and BPDU Guard


- **PortFast** is configured on edge ports to allow them to quickly move to forwarding bypassing listening and learning and avoids TCN (Topology Change Notification) messages
- **BPDU Guard** can prevent loops by moving PortFast configured interfaces that receive BPDUs to errdisable state
- BPDU Guard prevents ports configured with PortFast from being incorrectly connected to another switch
- When enabled globally, BPDU Guard applies to all interfaces that are in an operational PortFast state



Optimising the Layer 2 Design

STP Toolkit – PortFast and BPDU Guard


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
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Force Spanning Tree to Perform as Expected


- Place the root where you want it
 - Root primary/secondary macro
 - spanning-tree vlan 1-4094 root primary
- The root bridge should stay where you put it
 - RootGuard
 - LoopGuard
 - UplinkFast (PVST+)
 - UDLD
- Only end-station traffic should be seen on an edge port
 - PortFast
 - BPDU Guard
 - RootGuard
 - Port-security



Avoid Daisy Chaining Access Layer Switches

Daisy Chain without a backup link can cause traffic blackhole


Return Path Traffic Has a 50/50 Chance of Being 'Black Holed'



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
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Use Stacking Technologies for Access Layer Switches


Stacking Technology Addresses Old Problems

- **Stackwise/Stackwise-Plus** technology eliminates the concern
 - Loopback links not required
 - No longer forced to have L2 link in distribution
- If you use modular (chassis-based) switches, these problems are not a concern




Asymmetric Routing (Unicast Flooding)

- Affects redundant topologies with shared L2 access
- One path upstream and two paths downstream
- CAM table entry ages out on standby HSRP
- Without a CAM entry packet is flooded to all ports in the VLAN




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
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
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
Best Practices Prevent Unknown Unicast Flooding

- Assign one unique data and voice VLAN to each access switch
- Traffic is now only flooded down one trunk
- Access switch unicasts correctly; no flooding to all ports
- If you have to:
 - Tune ARP and CAM aging timers; CAM timer exceeds ARP timer
 - Bias routing metrics to remove equal cost routes




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
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Integrated Security Toolkit

Securing Layer 2 From Surveillance Attacks

Cutting Off MAC-Based Attacks




Problem –

Hacking Tools Enable Attackers to Flood Switch
CAM Tables with Bogus MACs – Turning the
VLAN into a [Hub](#)

Switch CAM Table Limit Is
Finite Number of MAC Addresses

Securing Layer 2 From Surveillance Attacks

Cutting Off MAC-Based Attacks




Problem –

Hacking Tools Enable Attackers to Flood Switch CAM Tables with Bogus MACs – Turning the VLAN into a [Hub](#)

Switch CAM Table Limit Is
Finite Number of MAC Addresses

Only Three MAC
Addresses Allowed
on the Port:
Shutdown




Solution –

Port Security Limits MAC Flooding Attack – Locks Down Port and Sends an SNMP Trap

```
switchport port-security
switchport port-security maximum 10
switchport port-security violation restrict
switchport port-security aging time 2
switchport port-security aging type inactivity
```

DHCP Snooping


Protection Against Rogue / Malicious DHCP Server



- DHCP requests (discover) and responses (offer) tracked
- Rate-limit requests on trusted interfaces –limits DoS attacks on DHCP server
- Deny responses (offers) on non-trusted interfaces – stop malicious or errant DHCP server

DHCP Snooping

Protection Against Rogue / Malicious DHCP Server




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Securing Layer 2

From Surveillance Attacks

Protection Against ARP Poisoning –

- **Dynamic ARP inspection** protects against ARP poisoning (ettercap, dsnif, arpspoof)
- Uses the DHCP Snooping binding table
- Tracks MAC to IP from DHCP transactions
- Rate-limits ARP requests from client ports
- Drop **bogus** gratuitous ARPs – stops ARP poisoning / “Man In The Middle” attacks




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


IP Source Guard

Protection Against Spoofed IP Addresses

- **IP Source Guard** protects against spoofed IP addresses
- Uses the DHCP Snooping binding table
- Tracks IP address to port associations
- Dynamically programs port ACL to drop traffic not originating from IP address assigned via DHCP

Gateway = 10.1.1.1
MAC=A




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Catalyst Integrated Security Features

Summary




- **Port security** prevents MAC flooding attacks
- **DHCP Snooping** prevents client attack on the switch and server
- **Dynamic ARP Inspection** adds security to ARP using the DHCP snooping table
- **IP Source Guard** adds security to IP source addresses, using the DHCP snooping table

```
ip dhcp snooping
ip dhcp snooping vlan 2-10
ip arp inspection vlan 2-10
!
interface fa3/1
switchport port-security
switchport port-security max 11
switchport port-security violation restrict
switchport port-security aging time 2
switchport port-security aging type inactivity
ip arp inspection limit rate 100
ip dhcp snooping limit rate 100
ip verify source vlandhcp-snooping
!
Interface gigabit1/1
ip dhcp snooping trust
ip arp inspection trust
```

Control Plane Protection CoPP


Control Plane Performance

Control Plane Processes



Control Plane Oversubscription

Control Plane features are processed by the switch CPU so there is a limited amount of processing power available for these tasks. If that CPU is swamped, all other processes stop. This can have a bad impact on the switch if the CPU is overwhelmed for a period of time...



Result of CPU overload

- Dropping Routing Neighbours
- Failure to send Route Updates
- Failure to send STP Updates
- Failure to keep up with Logging requests
- No ARP's processed
- CLI locks up
- Switch locking up
- and more...

REFERENCE : Example Protocols and Services Processes in Software



Control Plane Protocols	Control Plane Packet Forwarding
UDLD Protocol	IP Options
PagP Protocol	Fragmentation
LACP Protocol	Select Tunnel Options
SNMP Protocol	ICMP Packets
Syslog Export	MTU failure
Netflow & Netflow Data Export	TTL=1 or TTL=0
Address Resolution Protocol	Packets with Checksum error or error length
HSRP, VRRP, GLBP	RPF Check
Cisco Discovery Protocol	Packets that require ARP resolution
VLAN Trunking Protocol	Non-IP (IPX, Appletalk)
Dynamic Trunking Protocol	ACL logging
Telnet, IP Sec, SSH	Broadcast traffic denied in RACL
BGP, OSPF, EIGRP, RIP, ISIS	Authentication Proxy
Web Cache Control Protocol	PBR traffic for certain “match” or “set” arguments

Control Plane Protection on Catalyst Switches

	Catalyst 6500 / 6800 Series	Catalyst 4500 Series	Catalyst 3850 series
Hardware Rate-Limiters	Yes	No	Yes
Modular QoS Class Maps	Yes	Yes	Yes (16.x and newer)

SUP2T Control Plane Protection

Hardware Rate Limiters Support

Unicast Rate Limiters	
CEF Receive	Traffic Destined to the Router
CEF Receive Secondary	Traffic destined to an IP address terminated on the C6500
CEF Glean	Traffic requiring ARP
CEF No Route	Packets with Not Route in the FIB
ICMP Redirect	Packets that Require ICMP Redirects
IP Errors	Packet with IP Checksum or Length Errors
ICMP No Route	ICMP Unreachables for Unroutable Packets
ICMP ACL Drop	ICMP Unreachables for Admin Deny Packets
RPF Failure	Packets that Fail uRPF Check
L3 Security	CBAC, Auth-Proxy, and IPSEC Traffic
ACL Bridged In	NAT, TCP Int, Reflexive ACLs, Log on ACLs
ACL Bridged Out	NAT, TCP Int, Reflexive ACLs, Log on ACLs
ARP Inspection	Dynamic ARP Inspection Traffic to CPU
DHCP Snoop In	DHCP Snooping Traffic to CPU
IP Features	Security Features (Auth-Proxy, IP Sec, others)
UCAST UNKNOWN FLOOD	L2 unknown unicast traffic
VACL Logging	CLI Notification of VACL Denied Packets
IP Options	Unicast Traffic with IP Options Set
Capture	Used with Optimised ACL Logging

Layer 2 Rate Limiters	
LAYER_2 PT	L2PT Encapsulation/Decapsulation
LAYER_2 PDU	Layer 2 PDUs
MAC PBF In	
IP Admis. on L2 Port	
LAYER_2 PORTSEC	
LAYER_2 SPAN PCAP	

General Rate Limiters	
MTU Failure	Packets Requiring Fragmentation
TTL Failure	Packets with TTL<=1
Capture Pkt	Limits packets punted to the CPU because of Optimised ACL Logging (OAL).
DIAG RESERVED 0	Reserved
DIAG RESERVED 1	Reserved
DIAG RESERVED 2	Reserved
MCAST REPL RESERVED	Reserved

Control Plane Protection Comparison Sup720 and Sup2T

Feature/Capability	Sup720	Sup2T
Uses Modular QoS CLI for applying policies to the Control Plane Interface	Yes	Yes
Special Case Rate-Limiters for non-IP traffic types (HWRL)	Yes	Yes
Max number of HWRLs supported	8 (L3) 4 (L2)	31 (L3) 26 (L2)
Distributed policing: synchronisation of hardware policers on different linecards	No	Yes
HWRL measured in Packets and Bits per second	No, PPS only	Yes, PPS and BPS
Traffic Counters	CoPP only	Yes, both HWRL and CoPP
Traffic Exceptions configurable in CoPP (allow CoPP based counters and monitoring)	No	Yes
Full suite of Multicast HWRL	No	Yes
Microflow Policers via CoPP	No	Yes
Ability to leak the first packet above the rate (allows packet capture)	No	Yes
CoPP Polices to match ARP and RARP traffic	No	Yes

SUP2T Control Plane Protection

Hardware Rate Limiters Support

Multicast Rate Limiters	
MCAST IPV4 FIB MISS	Packets with No mroute in the FIB
MCAST IPv4 IGMP	IGMP Packets
MCAST IPv4 Direct C	Local Multicast on Connected Interface
MCAST IPV4 OPTIONS	Multicast Traffic with IP Options Set
MCAST IPV4 CONTROL PK	IPv4 Multicast Control Traffic to CPU
MCAST IPV6 DIRECTLY C	Packets with No Mroute in the FIB
MCAST IPV6 MLD	IPv6 Multicast Control Traffic to CPU
MCAST IPV6 CONTROL PK	Partial Shortcut Entries
MCAST BRG FLD IP CNTR	Partial Shortcut Entries
MCAST BRG FLD IP	Partial Shortcut Entries
MCAST BRG	Partial Shortcut Entries
MCAST BRG OMF	Partial Shortcut Entries
V6 Route Control	Partial Shortcut Entries
V6 Default Route	Multicast Traffic with IP Options Set
V6 Second Drop	Multicast Traffic with IP Options Set

These HWRL were all covered as a single HWRL in the PFC3

Some new HWRL are added and also more granularity to existing HWRLs is provided in the PFC4 versus PFC3

Catalyst 3850 Built in Rate Limiters (IOS-XE 3.x)

```
C3850#show platform qos queue stats internal cpu policer
```

For Asic 0

Queue	Enabled	Rate(default)	Rate(set)	Drop
-------	---------	---------------	-----------	------

DOT1X Auth	No	1000	1000	0
------------	----	------	------	---

L2 Control	No	500	500	0
------------	----	-----	-----	---

Forus traffic	No	1000	1000	0
---------------	----	------	------	---

ICMP GEN	Yes	200	200	0
----------	-----	-----	-----	---

Routing Control	No	500	500	0
-----------------	----	-----	-----	---

Forus Address resolution	No	1000	1000	0
--------------------------	----	------	------	---

ICMP Redirect	No	500	500	0
---------------	----	-----	-----	---

WLESS PRI-5	No	1000	1000	0
-------------	----	------	------	---

WLESS PRI-1	No	1000	1000	0
-------------	----	------	------	---

WLESS PRI-2	No	1000	1000	0
-------------	----	------	------	---

WLESS PRI-3	No	1000	1000	0
-------------	----	------	------	---

WLESS PRI-4	No	1000	1000	0
-------------	----	------	------	---

BROADCAST	Yes	200	200	0
-----------	-----	-----	-----	---

Learning cache ovfl	Yes	100	100	0
---------------------	-----	-----	-----	---

Sw forwarding	Yes	1000	1000	0
---------------	-----	------	------	---

Topology Control	No	13000	13000	0
------------------	----	-------	-------	---

Proto Snooping	No	500	500	0
----------------	----	-----	-----	---

DHCP Snooping	No	1000	1000	0
---------------	----	------	------	---

Transit Traffic	Yes	500	500	0
-----------------	-----	-----	-----	---

RPF Failed	Yes	100	100	0
------------	-----	-----	-----	---

MCAST END STATION	Yes	2000	2000	0
-------------------	-----	------	------	---

LOGGING	Yes	1000	1000	0
---------	-----	------	------	---

Punt Webauth	No	1000	1000	0
--------------	----	------	------	---

Crypto Control	Yes	100	100	0
----------------	-----	-----	-----	---

Exception	Yes	100	100	0
-----------	-----	-----	-----	---

General Punt	No	500	500	0
--------------	----	-----	-----	---

NFL SAMPLED DATA	Yes	100	100	0
------------------	-----	-----	-----	---

SGT Cache Full	Yes	1000	1000	
----------------	-----	------	------	--

Catalyst 3850 Default Class-maps for Control Plane Policing (IOS-XE 16.x)

```
!  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-topology-control  
    description Topology control  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-sw-forward  
    description Sw forwarding, SGT Cache Full, LOGGING  
class-map match-any system-cpp-default  
    description DHCP snooping, show forward and rest of traffic  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-sys-data  
    description Learning cache ovfl, Crypto Control, Exception, EGR  
    Exception, NFL SAMPLED DATA, Gold Pkt, RPF Failed  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-punt-webauth  
    description Punt Webauth  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-l2lvx-control  
    description L2 LVX control packets  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-forus  
    description Forus Address resolution and Forus traffic  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-multicast-end-station  
    description MCAST END STATION  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-multicast  
    description Transit Traffic and MCAST Data
```

```
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-l2-control  
    description L2 control  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-dot1x-auth  
    description DOT1X Auth  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-data  
    description ICMP_GEN and BROADCAST  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-control-low-priority  
    description ICMP redirect and general punt  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-wireless-priority1  
    description Wireless priority 1  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-wireless-priority2  
    description Wireless priority 2  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-wireless-priority3-4-5  
    description Wireless priority 3,4 and 5  
class-map match-any non-client-nrt-class  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-routing-control  
    description Routing control  
class-map match-any system-cpp-police-protocol-snooping  
    description Protocol snooping  
!
```

Catalyst 4500 Sup7/Sup8 CoPP Macro and Class-Maps

Switch(config)# qos	Class system-cpp-igmp
Switch(config)# macro global apply system-cpp	Class system-cpp-pim
Switch# show policy-map system-cpp-policy	Class system-cpp-all-systems-on-subnet
Policy Map system-cpp-policy	Class system-cpp-all-routers-on-subnet
Class system-cpp-dot1x	Class system-cpp-ripv2
Class system-cpp-bpdu-range	Class system-cpp-ip-mcast-linklocal
Class system-cpp-cdp	Class system-cpp-dhcp-cs
police 32000 bps 1000 byte conform-action transmit exceed-action drop	Class system-cpp-dhcp-sc
Class system-cpp-sstp	Class system-cpp-dhcp-ss
Class system-cpp-cgmp	* Class telnet-class
Class system-cpp-ospf	police 80000 1000 byte conform-action drop exceed-action drop
Class system-cpp-hsrpv2	

Sup2T CoPP Default Class-Maps

Default Class-Maps Supported with Sup2T

class-map: class-copp-icmp-redirect-unreachable (match-all)

class-map: class-copp-ucast-rpf-fail (match-all)

class-map: class-copp-vacl-log (match-all)

class-map: class-copp-mcast-punt (match-all)

class-map: class-copp-mcast-copy (match-all)

class-map: class-copp-ip-connected (match-all)

class-map: class-copp-ipv6-connected (match-all)

class-map: class-copp-match-pim-data (match-any)

class-map: class-copp-match-pimv6-data (match-any)

class-map: class-copp-match-mld (match-any)

class-map: class-copp-match-igmp (match-any)

class-map: class-copp-match-ndv6 (match-any)

SUP2T Control Plane Protection

Default Class-maps for Control Plane Protection

Using the class-maps allows for better visibility using show commands

```
Router#show policy-map control-plane input class class-copp-options
```

Control Plane Interface

Service-policy input: policy-default-autocopp

Hardware Counters:

class-map: class-copp-options (match-all)

Match: any

police :

100 pps 24 limit 24 extended limit

Earl in slot 1 :

0 packets

5 minute offered rate 0 pps

aggregate-forwarded 0 packets

action: transmit

exceeded 0 packets action: drop

aggregate-forward 0 pps exceed 0 pps

Earl in slot 3 :

997 packets

5 minute offered rate 196 pps

aggregate-forwarded 198 packets

action: transmit

exceeded 798 packets action: drop

aggregate-forward 99 pps exceed 400 pps

Earl in slot 5 :

0 packets

5 minute offered rate 0 pps

Default Class map “class-copp-options” classifies traffic with IP Options set

Traffic counters matching the class-map on the DFC in slot3

Catalyst Control Plane Protection

CoPP Deployment - Step 1

Step 1: Identify traffic of interest and classify it into multiple traffic classes:

- BGP
- IGP (EIGRP, OSPF, ISIS)
- Management (telnet, TACACS, ssh, SNMP, NTP)
- Reporting (SAA)
- Monitoring (ICMP)
- Critical applications (HSRP, DHCP)
- Undesirable
- Default

```
ip access-list extended coppacl-bgp
permit tcp host 192.168.1.1 host 10.1.1.1 eq bgp
permit tcp host 192.168.1.1 eq bgp host 10.1.1.1
!
ip access-list extended coppacl-igp
permit ospf any host 224.0.0.5
permit ospf any host 224.0.0.6
permit ospf any any
!
ip access-list extended coppacl-management
permit tcp host 10.2.1.1 host 10.1.1.1 established
permit tcp 10.2.1.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.1.1.1 eq 22
permit tcp 10.86.183.0 0.0.0.255 any eq telnet
permit udp host 10.2.2.2 host 10.1.1.1 eq snmp
permit udp host 10.2.2.3 host 10.1.1.1 eq ntp
!
```

Catalyst Control Plane Protection

CoPP Deployment - Step 2

Step 2: Associate the identified traffic with a class, and permit the traffic in each class – **Start with a generous amount of allowed traffic**

- Must enable QoS globally(Sup720 only), else CoPP will not be applied in hardware
- Always apply a policing action for each class since the switch will ignore a class that does not have a corresponding policing action (for example "police 31500000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop").
- Alternatively, both conform-action and exceed-action could be set to transmit, but doing so will allocate a default policer as opposed to a dedicated policer with its own hardware counters.
- HW CoPP classes are limited to one match per class-map

Catalyst Control Plane Protection

CoPP Deployment - Step 2

Step 2: Associate the identified traffic with a class, and permit the traffic in each class – **Start with a generous amount of allowed traffic**

- Must enable QoS globally(Sup720 on

```
class-map match-all copp-bgp
  match access-group name coppacl-bgp
class-map match-all copp-igmp
  match access-group name coppacl-igmp
class-map match-all copp-management
  match access-group name coppacl-management
class-map match-all copp-reporting
  match access-group name coppacl-reporting
class-map match-all copp-monitoring
  match access-group name coppacl-monitoring
class-map match-all copp-critical-app
  match access-group name coppacl-critical-app
class-map match-all copp-undesirable
  match access-group name coppacl-undesirable
```

```
policy-map copp-policy
  class copp-bgp
    police 30000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class copp-igmp
    police 30000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class copp-management
    police 30000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class copp-reporting
    police 30000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class copp-monitoring
    police 30000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class copp-critical-app
    police 30000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class copp-undesirable
    police 30000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class class-default
    police 30000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
```

```
control-plane
  service-policy input copp-policy
```

Catalyst Control Plane Protection

CoPP Deployment - Step 3

Step 3: Adjust classification, and apply liberal CoPP policies for each class of traffic

- show policy-map control-plane displays dynamic information for monitoring control plane policy.
- Statistics include rate information and number of packets/ bytes confirmed or exceeding each traffic class

```
Switch# show policy-map control-plane
Control Plane Interface
Service-policy input: copp-policy
<snip>
Hardware Counters:
class-map: copp-monitoring (match-all)
Match: access-group name coppacl-monitoring
policy :
  300000000 bps 937000 limit 937000 extended limit
Earl in slot 5 :
  0 bytes
  5 minute offered rate 0 bps
  aggregate-forwarded 0 bytes action: transmit
  exceeded 0 bytes action: drop
  aggregate-forward 0 bps exceed 0 bps
Earl in slot 7 :
  112512 bytes
  5 minute offered rate 3056 bps
  aggregate-forwarded 112512 bytes action: transmit
  exceeded 0 bytes action: drop
  aggregate-forward 90008 bps exceed 0 bps

=====
```

Catalyst Control Plane Protection

CoPP Deployment—Step 3 (Cont.)

Step 3: Adjust Classification, and Apply liberal CoPP policies for each class of traffic

- show ip access-lists provides packet count statistics per ACE. Absence of any hits on an entry indicate lack of traffic matching the ACE criteria—the rule might be rewritten
- Hardware ACL hit counters are available in PFC3B/BXL and newer for security ACL TCAM only (not QoS ACL TCAM)

```
Switch#show access-list
```

```
Extended IP access list coppacl-bgp
 10 permit tcp host 192.168.1.1 host 10.1.1.1 eq bgp
 20 permit tcp host 192.168.1.1 eq bgp host 10.1.1.1
Extended IP access list coppacl-critical-app
 10 permit ip any host 224.0.0.1
 20 permit udp host 0.0.0.0 host 255.255.255.255 eq bootps
 30 permit udp host 10.2.2.8 eq bootps any eq bootps
Extended IP access list coppacl-igmp
 10 permit ospf any host 224.0.0.5 (64062 matches)
 20 permit ospf any host 224.0.0.6
 30 permit ospf any any (17239 matches)
Extended IP access list coppacl-management
 10 permit tcp host 10.2.1.1 host 10.1.1.1 established
 20 permit tcp 10.2.1.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.1.1.1 eq 22
 30 permit tcp 10.86.183.0 0.0.0.255 any eq telnet
 40 permit udp host 10.2.2.2 host 10.1.1.1 eq snmp
 50 permit udp host 10.2.2.3 host 10.1.1.1 eq ntp
Extended IP access list coppacl-monitoring
 10 permit icmp any any ttl-exceeded (120 matches)
 20 permit icmp any any port-unreachable
 30 permit icmp any any echo-reply (17273 matches)
 40 permit icmp any any echo (5 matches)
Extended IP access list coppacl-reporting
 10 permit icmp host 10.2.2.4 host 10.1.1.1 echo
Extended IP access list coppacl-undesirable
 10 permit udp any any eq 1434
```

Catalyst Control Plane Protection

CoPP Deployment - Step 4

Step 4: Fine tune the control plane policy

- Narrow the ACL permit statements to only allow known authorised source addresses and depending on class defined, apply appropriate policy
 - Routing protocol traffic — no rate limit or very conservative rate limit
 - Management traffic — conservative rate limit
 - Reporting traffic — conservative rate limit
 - Monitoring traffic — conservative rate limit
 - Critical traffic — conservative rate limit
 - Default traffic — low rate limit
 - Undesirable traffic — drop

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps708/products_white_paper0900aecd802ca5d6.shtml

Catalyst Control Plane Protection

CoPP Deployment - Step 4

Step 4: Fine tune the control plane policy

- Narrow the ACL permit statements to only allow known, authorized sources
 - Routing protocol traffic — no
 - Management traffic — conservative
 - Reporting traffic — conservative
 - Monitoring traffic — conservative
 - Critical traffic — conservative
 - Default traffic — low rate limit
 - Undesirable traffic — drop


```
policy-map copp-policy
  class coppclass-bgp
    police 15000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class coppclass-igp
    police 15000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class coppclass-management
    police 2560000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class coppclass-reporting
    police 1000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class coppclass-monitoring
    police 1000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class coppclass-critical-app
    police 7500000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class coppclass-undesirable
    police 32000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
  class class-default
    police 1000000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop
```

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps708/products_white_paper0900aecd802ca5d6.shtml

Catalyst Control Plane Protection


Mitigating attacks with CoPP and CPU RL (Example)

- Multiple concurrent attacks (multicast ttl=1, multicast partial shortcuts, unicast IP options, unicast fragments to receive adjacency, unicast TCP SYN flood to receive adjacency)
- CPU kept within acceptable bounds with no loss of mission critical traffic



Alternative Designs

Simplified Layer 2 Access with VSS Distribution




**Reduced routing
neighbours, Minimal L3
reconvergence**

**No FHRPs
No Looped topology
Policy Management**

**Multiple active uplinks
per VLAN, No STP
convergence**

Simplified Layer 2 Access with VSS Distribution




**Reduced routing
neighbours, Minimal L3
reconvergence**

**No FHRPs
No Looped topology
Policy Management**

**Multiple active uplinks
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convergence**

Simplified Layer 2 Access with VSS Distribution




**Reduced routing
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No Looped topology
Policy Management**

**Multiple active uplinks
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convergence**

Simplified Layer 2 Access with VSS Distribution



**Reduced routing
neighbours, Minimal L3
reconvergence**

**No FHRPs
No Looped topology
Policy Management**

**Multiple active uplinks
per VLAN, No STP
convergence**

VSS Simplifies the Configuration

Standalone Switch 1 (Coordinated Configuration)



Standalone Switch 2 (Coordinated Configuration)



VSS (One simplified configuration)



Spanning Tree Configuration

! Enable 802.1d per VLAN spanning tree enhancements.
 spanning-tree mode pvst
 spanning-tree loopguard default
 no spanning-tree optimise bpdv transmission
 spanning-tree extend system-id
 spanning-tree uplinkfast
 spanning-tree backbonefast
 spanning-tree vlan 2,4,6,8,10 priority 24576!

! Enable 802.1d per VLAN spanning tree enhancements.
 spanning-tree mode pvst
 spanning-tree loopguard default
 no spanning-tree optimise bpdv transmission
 spanning-tree extend system-id
 spanning-tree uplinkfast
 spanning-tree backbonefast
 spanning-tree vlan 3,5,7,9,11 priority 24576!

! Enable 802.1d per VLAN spanning tree enhancements
 spanning-tree mode rapid-pvst
 no spanning-tree optimise bpdv transmission
 spanning-tree extend system-id
 spanning-tree vlan 2-11 priority 24576

L3 SVI Configuration (sample for 1 VLAN)

! Define the Layer 3 SVI for each voice and data VLAN
 interface Vlan4
 description Data VLAN
 ip address 10.120.4.3 255.255.255.0
 no ip redirects
 no ip unreachable
 ! Reduce PIM query interval to 250 msec
 ip pim query-interval 250 msec
 ip pim sparse-mode
 load-interval 30
 ! Define HSRP default gateway with 250/800 msec hello/hold
 standby 1 ip 10.120.4.1
 standby 1 timers msec 250 msec 800
 ! Set preempt delay large enough to allow network to stabilise
 before HSRP
 ! switches back on power on or link recovery
 standby 1 preempt delay minimum 180
 ! Enable HSRP authentication
 standby 1 authentication cisco123

! Define the Layer 3 SVI for each voice and data VLAN
 interface Vlan4
 description Data VLAN
 ip address 10.120.4.3 255.255.255.0
 no ip redirects
 no ip unreachable
 ! Reduce PIM query interval to 250 msec
 ip pim query-interval 250 msec
 ip pim sparse-mode
 load-interval 30
 ! Define HSRP default gateway with 250/800 msec hello/hold
 standby 1 ip 10.120.4.1
 standby 1 timers msec 250 msec 800
 ! Set preempt delay large enough to allow network to stabilise
 before HSRP
 ! switches back on power on or link recovery
 standby 1 preempt delay minimum 180
 ! Enable HSRP authentication
 standby 1 authentication cisco123

! Define the Layer 3 SVI for each voice and data VLAN
 interface Vlan4
 description Data VLAN
 ip address 10.120.2.1 255.255.255.0
 no ip redirects
 no ip unreachable
 ip pim sparse-mode
 load-interval 30


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What exactly is a Fabric?


A Fabric is an Overlay

An “Overlay” is a *logical topology* used to *virtually connect* devices, built *on top* of an arbitrary physical “Underlay” topology.

An “Overlay” network often uses *alternate forwarding attributes* to provide *additional services*, not provided by the “Underlay”.

Examples of Network Overlays

- | | |
|------------------|--------|
| • GRE or mGRE | • LISP |
| • MPLS or VPLS | • OTV |
| • IPsec or DMVPN | • DFA |
| • CAPWAP | • ACI |



Where To Get More Information

- Cisco Live Sessions in Melbourne
 - BRKCRS 1800 DNA Campus Fabric – An Introduction – Wednesday 8:30am
 - BRKCRS 3800 DNA Campus Fabric – Deep Dive – Friday 8:45am
 - BRKCRS 2801 DNA Campus Fabric – How to Integrate With Your Existing Network – Thursday 4:30pm
 - BRKCRS 2031 Enterprise Campus Design – Multilayer Architecture and Design Principals – Wednesday 2:30PM
- Cisco Validated Designs
 - Campus LAN and Wireless LAN Design Guide
<http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/td/docs/solutions/CVD/Oct2016/CVD-Campus-LAN-WLAN-Design-2016OCT.pdf>
 - Campus LAN Layer 2 Access with Simplified Distribution Deployment Guide
http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/td/docs/solutions/CVD/Oct2015/CVD-Campus_LAN_L2_Access_Simplified_Dist_Deployment-Oct2015.pdf

Summary

Designing Layer 2 Networks is Easy!

- Limit the size of the L2 domain as much as possible
- Use L1-L2 best practices to harden the network and eliminate common causes of loops
- Implement Spanning Tree tool kit “Make the network fail closed!”
- Use the Integrated Security tool kit to harden the network from malicious or non-malicious network events
- Harden the control plane of the network devices with Control Plane Protection tools
- Consider alternate designs that minimise L2 loops

Q & A

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




Thank you



You're



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