



*TOMORROW
starts here.*

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Securing Wireless LANs

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#clmel

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Agenda

- Define terms and approach
- Enterprise WLANs – Threats, Vulnerabilities and Mitigation strategies
- External threats – Detection, Identification and Remediation
- Conclusion





What does “secure” really mean?

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Dictionary Definition

1. Free from danger or attack
2. Free from risk of loss; safe
3. Free from risk of being intercepted or listened to by unauthorised persons
4. Reliable; Dependable
5. Assured; Certain

thefreedictionary.com

<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/secure>

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3 Key Elements

1. Confidentiality
2. Integrity
3. Availability

Maybe some others:

Accountability, Auditability, Authenticity, Non-repudiation, Privacy, etc.



How much security is enough?

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Need to Assess Risk

Risk Assessment Process

1. Identify threats and vulnerabilities
2. Assess consequence if they were to occur
3. Determine likelihood of occurrence
4. Calculate risk
5. For any unacceptable risk, identify mitigation/control options
6. Re-assess risk following application of controls

Severity level	Probability of occurrence				
	(A) Frequent	(B) Probable	(C) Occasional	(D) Remote	(E) Improbable
I (High)	■	■	■	□	■
II	■	□	□	□	■
III	■	□	□	■	■
IV (Low)	■	■	□	□	□

■ = Risk 1 (undesirable and requires immediate corrective action)
□ = Risk 2 (undesirable and requires corrective action, but some management discretion allowed)
■ = Risk 3 (acceptable with review by management)
□ = Risk 4 (acceptable without review by management)


NEEDS TO BE PERFORMED EARLY IN THE DESIGN PROCESS

Risk Mitigation

Some thoughts

- The only vector that can be changed is “likelihood of occurrence”
- Common approaches:
 - Add time
 - Make compromise more difficult
- Need to consider cost and usability
- Technology is not always the answer
- Management support is mandatory


A Typical Enterprise Network




Wireless Threats and Vulnerabilities

- Wireless propagates beyond the traditional physical boundaries of the wired network
 - Attack could originate from outside traditional enterprise boundaries
 - **Passive scanning** attacks
 - **Active spoofing** attacks
 - **Active jamming** or **DoS** attacks
- Rogue APs can be a source of different vulnerabilities
 - Honeypot APs
 - Unsecured backdoor access
- Wireless Clients themselves can introduce vulnerabilities as well
 - Bridge wireless to wired network
 - Unsecured Hot-Spot usage
 - Data Seepage

Assessing Risk







Wireless Clients

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Assessing Risk – Wireless Clients







Wireless Client Considerations

Some thoughts

- What user groups?
 - Guests? Do they need to be treated differently
- How many devices? What kind?
 - Do they all represent the same level of risk? Probably not
- Usage patterns
 - Are they different to usage of wired devices? Probably yes
- Access locations
 - Are wireless clients accessing the network from new locations? Quite likely

Wireless Clients - Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities

Analysed through the CIA lens

- Confidentiality
 - What data is stored on the device?
 - Is it appropriately secured?
 - Who has/could have access? Directly? Indirectly?
- Integrity
 - Need to ensure that data isn't altered without authorisation
 - Also want to ensure the integrity of your network
- Availability
 - Vital to ensure that the right person has the right access to the right information at the right time from the right device

Mitigation

Identity and device management

- Who is trying to connect to the network?
- What type of device is it? What is its current state?
- What time of day is it?
- Where is it connecting from? Wired? Wireless? VPN?
- Based on all of the above, how much do I trust this device?

What access should the user and device combination have to the network and other corporate resources?

Cisco Identity Services Engine

Delivering Visibility, Context, and Control to Secure Network Access

NETWORK / USER
CONTEXT



Who



What



When



Where



How



DEVICE PROFILING
FEED SERVICE



**REDUCE NETWORK UNKNOWNNS AND APPLY THE *RIGHT LEVEL* OF
SECURE ACCESS CONSISTENTLY ACROSS WIRED, WIRELESS and VPN**

**Guest
Access**




**BYOD and
Enterprise
Mobility**



**Secure
Access**



AnyConnect



Clients

Desktop

Microsoft
Windows



Mac OS X



Linux



Mobile

Apple iOS
iPhone and
iPad



BB10 (future)
• Smartphones
• Playbook

Android
Smartphones
Tablets



- HTC
- Motorola
- Samsung
- Version 4.0+

- HTC
- Lenovo
- Motorola
- Samsung
- Version 4.0+

Clientless




Risk Assessment – Mobile Devices

RISK	MITIGATION
Unauthorised access to data viewed on mobile device	AnyConnect – control network access ISE – granular access controls once connected
Mobile device lost or stolen	ISE – revoke network access MDM – remote wipe
Unauthorised data stored on mobile device	ISE – granular network access controls *Additional mitigation may be necessary (depending on corporate security policy)
Unauthorised mobile device used to access and/or compromise the wireless network	Various controls – (ISE, network infrastructure, AAA, WIPS, Layer 4 – 7 controls, ACLs, etc.)
Mobile device used to created an unauthorised “hotspot” or bridge to the corporate network	AnyConnect – control active network interfaces on mobile device Wired 802.1x – manage wired access



Securing the RF Environment

Assessing Risk – RF Transmission




RF Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities

- Confidentiality
 - Ensure that any intercepted data is not readable
 - Ensure that only authorised users and devices are able to access the network
- Integrity
 - ensure that transmitted data and management traffic is not altered in transit
- Availability
 - deal with RF interference, both intentional and accidental

Radio Frequency (RF) Availability


Spectrum Intelligence Solution - Cisco CleanAir



CleanAir
Hardware based Solution



32 times WiFi chip's visibility
Accurate classification
Multiple device recognition




- Spectrum intelligence solution designed to proactively manage the challenges of a shared spectrum
- Assess impact to Wi-Fi performance; proactively change channels when needed
- CleanAir Radio ASIC: Only ASIC based solution can reliably detect interference sources
- TURN IT ON!

Radio Resource Management

1. Dynamic Channel Assignment
2. Transmit Power Control
3. Coverage Hole Detection and Mitigation

- What It Does

- Dynamically balances infrastructure and mitigate changes
- Monitor and maintain coverage for all clients
- Provide the optimal throughput under changing conditions



Radio Frequency (RF) Emanation

- All Cisco AP's use variable power radios
- There will ALWAYS* be some RF leakage
- With a decent antenna your wireless data transmission can be intercepted from some distance away



Wireless Encryption

WPA

- A snapshot of the 802.11i Standard
- Commonly used with TKIP encryption

WPA2

- Final version of 802.11i
- Commonly used with AES encryption

Authentication Mechanisms

- Personal (PSK – Pre-Shared Key)
- Enterprise (802.1X/EAP)



802.11 Fundamentals

Beacons and Probes



← Beacon —

SSID = blizzard, Security = WPA2-Enterprise

← Beacon —

SSID = ciscolive, Security = WPA2-Personal

— Probe Request →

SSID = blizzard

← Probe Response -

SSID = blizzard, Security = WPA2-Enterprise

— Probe Request →



SSID = ciscolive


← Probe Response -


SSID = ciscolive, Security = WPA2-Personal

802.11 Fundamentals

Association



Generate Identity 

Generate network 

> VISUAL IDENTITY

> NOSE



> NETWORK

> FACEBOOK

-  Alicia Blunt
-  Networks: Harvard Alum '07
-  France
-  Sex: Female
-  Interested In: Men
-  Relationship Status:
-  In a Relationship
-  Birthday: June 11
-  Hometown: PARIS, France
-  Political Views: Very Liberal


FRIENDS



randomize


802.11 Fundamentals

Authentication





802.11 Fundamentals

Authentication




802.11 Fundamentals


Authentication



802.11 Fundamentals



Authentication





802.11 Fundamentals

Encryption



$PTK = \text{SHA}(\text{PMK} + \text{ANonce} + \text{SNonce} + \text{AP MAC} + \text{STA MAC})$

Secure Fast Roaming

Challenges

- Client channel scanning and AP selection
- Re-authentication of client device and re-keying



Secure Fast Roaming

Cisco Compatible Extensions

- Client channel scanning and AP selection
 - Improved via Cisco Compatible Extensions (CCX) Neighbour Lists
- Re-authentication of client device and re-keying
 - Cisco Centralised Key Management (CCKM)
- In *highly controlled test environments*, CCKM roam times measure 5-8ms

- Available in CCX enabled clients

The screenshot shows a configuration page with tabs for General, Security, QoS, Policy-Mapping, and Advanced. The Security tab is active, and the Layer 2, Layer 3, and AAA Servers sub-tabs are visible. The Layer 2 Security is set to WPA+WPA2, and MAC Filtering is disabled. The Fast Transition option is also disabled. The Protected Management Frame (PMF) is set to Disabled. Under WPA+WPA2 Parameters, WPA Policy is disabled, WPA2 Policy is enabled, and WPA2 Encryption is set to AES. The Authentication Key Management section is highlighted with a blue box, showing 802.1X and CCKM both enabled, while PSK, FT 802.1X, and FT PSK are disabled. The WPA gtk-randomize State is set to Enable.




Secure Fast Roaming

Voice-Enterprise and 802.11k and 802.11r

- Client channel scanning and AP selection
 - Improved via 802.11k Neighbour Lists
- Re-authentication of client device and re-keying
 - 802.11r based on CCKM
- Available in Voice-Enterprise certified clients
 - Due to changes to 802.11 management frames, older client drivers may not understand the 11r response frame


The screenshot shows the configuration page for Layer 3 security. The 'Fast Transition' section is highlighted with a blue box, showing 'Fast Transition' checked, 'Over the DS' checked, and 'Reassociation Timeout' set to 20 seconds. Below this, the 'Protected Management Frame' section shows 'PMF' set to 'Disabled'. A warning dialog box is overlaid on the screen, stating 'Warning!! Non-802.11r Clients may not join on this WLAN' with an 'OK' button. At the bottom, the 'Authentication Key Management' section shows 'FT 802.1X' checked and 'WPA gtk-randomize State' set to 'Enable'.





Management Frame Protection

- Infrastructure Management Frame Protection
 - Detection
- Client Management Frame Protection
 - Prevention




Management Frame Protection

802.11w and Protected Management Frames



- Unicast Management Frames
 - Confidentiality and Integrity Protection
- Multicast Management Frames
 - Integrity Protection



Risk Assessment


RF environment

RISK	MITIGATION
Data transmitted over the wireless infrastructure can be intercepted and read	WPA2 uses AES encryption to protect all transmitted data
Wireless control traffic is altered in transit	Management Frame Protection ensures the integrity of all control traffic
An attacker attempts to compromise the network via spoofed control traffic	Management Frame Protection ensures the integrity of all control traffic
Availability of the wireless network compromised by RF interference, either accidental or malicious	CleanAir automatically detects, classifies and mitigates interference
An attacker attempts to masquerade as a legitimate corporate WLAN	Management Frame Protection (and WIPS – covered later)



Wired Infrastructure

Implications of wireless infrastructure on the existing wired network




Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities

- Is the wired network already trusted?
 - Risks should (in theory) already have been identified and treated if necessary
- Introduction of a wireless network may change the current risk profile
 - Change to network boundary
 - Change to traffic flows
 - Possible change to user/device population(s)
- What controls are currently in place that can be re-used?
 - Directory services
 - PKI
 - Etc.
- Availability
 - Wired must be at least as reliable as wireless

Wireless Standards

Impact of 802.11ac on the wired network



4SS	Desktops
3SS	Desktops / Laptops
2SS	Laptops / Tablets
1SS	Tablets / Smartphones

● = Connect Rates (Mbps)

SS = Spatial Streams

*Assuming 80 MHz channel is available and suitable

**Assuming 160 MHz channel is available and suitable

Application Visibility and Control

Guaranteed Quality of Service




Identify Applications using NBAR2

Application Cumulative Stats

App Name	Packet Count	Byte Count	Usage(%)
socks	850095	1.12 GB	49.00
rtsp	268447	307.75 MB	13.00
gtalk	615380	301.97 MB	13.00
google-earth	123565	157.04 MB	6.00
flash-video	97594	138.67 MB	6.00
google-services	89859	105.98 MB	4.00
ssl	72917	60.44 MB	2.00
http	100566	54.34 MB	2.00
rtp	142895	17.96 MB	0.00
google-plus	24245	13.49 MB	0.00

Application Cumulative Usage(%)




Control Application Behaviour

Application Name	Application Group Name	Action	DSCP	
bittorrent	file-sharing	drop	NA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
facebook	browsing	drop	NA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
citrix	business-and-productivity-to-	mark	34	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ms-lync	business-and-productivity-to-	mark	46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
webex-meeting	voice-and-video	mark	46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
pandora	voice-and-video	mark	10	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Network Design Implications

Centralised Wireless Deployment


- WLC acts as a chokepoint
- ASA provides policy enforcement and threat detection on wireless traffic before bridging onto the Enterprise network
- Wireless traffic tunneled to the network core
- Wireless traffic treated differently to wired traffic



Network Design Implications


Converged Access Deployment

- Wireless traffic bridged at the access layer
- Wireless traffic treated the same as wired traffic
- Wireless
 - wIPS
 - Rogue AP Detection
 - Containment
 - Switch Port Tracing
 - WSSI support pending
 - ACLs
 - AireSPACE
 - Downloadable
 - SGACL
- Wired
 - Security Features
 - Storm Control
 - Protected Ports
 - IP Source Guard
 - IPv6 First Hop Security
 - Application Visibility
 - Flexible Netflow
 - Wireshark
 - EEM



Authorisation

Network Segmentation



The Trouble with VLANs and ACLs - Scalability

- Granular authorisation to corporate assets is vital
- VLAN Segmentation and static ACLs are a common approach to network segmentation
- Current solution relies on named ACLs (64 ACL max) or static policy (ACL) on other network devices



TrustSec

A better way?

TrustSec lets you define policy in meaningful business terms

Business Policy




Destination Source	HR Database	Prod HRMS	Storage
Exec BYOD	X	X	X
Exec PC	X	✓	X
Prod HRMS	✓	✓	X
HR Database	✓	✓	✓



Trustsec SGA (Security Group Access)

SGT (Security Group Tag)



Security Group Based Access Control

- ISE maps tags (SGT) with user identity
- ISE Authorisation policy pushes SGT to ingress NAD (switch/WLC)
- ISE Authorisation policy pushes ACL (SGACL) to egress NAD (ASA or Nexus)

Risk Assessment

Wired infrastructure


RISK	MITIGATION
Introduction of wireless network compromises the security of the existing wired network	This risk assessment 😊
Wireless user/device obtains unauthorised access to corporate network resources	Trustsec security group tags (SGT) or VLAN/ACL used for network segmentation
Wireless network users overload current wired network capacity	Assessment of current wired network capacity and remediation if necessary



Advanced Security Capabilities

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
Advanced Security Capabilities



- Rogue AP Detection and Containment
- Layer 1 active jamming attacks
- Layer 2 active spoofing attacks


Rogue AP Detection

Rogue Location Discovery Protocol




Rogue AP Detection

Switch Port Tracing



Integrated IDS and Adaptive wIPS



- Monitor Mode AP / WLC Integrated IDS

- Rogue AP and Client Detection
- 17 Common Attack Signatures

- Enhanced Local Mode

- Enables Client Serving APs to periodically go off-channel for IDS scanning

- Adaptive wIPS

- Alarm Aggregation, Consolidation and False Positive Reduction
- Enhanced DoS Attack Behaviour Analysis
- Coordinated Rogue Containment
- Anomaly Detection
- Forensic, Blacklisting, Auto Containment, and Auto Immunity responses


Wireless Security and Spectrum Intelligence



Deployment Modes

Enhanced Local Mode

Data, WPS & CleanAir




AP Mode

AP Sub Mode

Monitor Mode

Data WPS & CleanAir




AP Mode

AP Sub Mode

AP3600/3700 with WSSI

Data, WPS & CleanAir



Data with WPS & CleanAir "On Channel"



Best Effort WPS coverage "Off Channel"



Data with CleanAir "On Channel"



WPS & CleanAir "All Channels"

Wireless Security and Spectrum Intelligence



Off Channel Scanning

Enhanced
Local Mode

Monitor Mode

Local Mode with
WSSI Module

- Dwell time
 - ELM: 50ms per-channel
 - MM: 1.2s per channel
- Monitor Mode
 - 1 Monitor Mode AP : 5 Local Mode
- WSSI Module
 - 1:5 Clean Air
 - 2:5 wIPS



Wireless Security and Spectrum Intelligence




CleanAir Integration

Type	Severity	Affected Channels	Last Updated	Detecting AP
WiFi Invalid Channel	9	36, 40, 44, 52, 56, 60, 64	2013-Dec-26, 22:42:35 PST	SJC14-42B-AP10
WiFi Invalid Channel	3	52, 56, 60	2013-Dec-24, 15:13:39 PST	SJC14-42B-AP9
WiFi Invalid Channel	N/A	52	2013-Dec-22, 18:10:28 PST	SJC14-41B-AP3
WiFi Invalid Channel	N/A	52	2013-Dec-22, 17:36:50 PST	SJC14-41B-AP2
WiFi Invalid Channel	N/A	52, 56, 60	2013-Dec-22, 06:03:51 PST	SJC14-41B-AP2
WiFi Invalid Channel	N/A		2013-Dec-20, 17:26:00 PST	SJC14-42B-AP1
WiFi Inverted	2	36, 40	2013-Dec-20, 16:29:46 PST	SJC14-42B-AP10
WiFi Inverted	2	36, 40, 44, 48, 52, 56, 60	2013-Dec-20, 15:27:39 PST	SJC14-42B-AP10
WiFi Inverted	N/A	36, 40, 44	2013-Dec-20, 15:03:29 PST	SJC14-41B-AP5
WiFi Inverted	3	40, 44, 48, 52, 56	2013-Dec-19, 16:53:18 PST	SJC14-42B-AP3




- Detection and location of RF layer DoS attacks
- Non-standard channel threat detection
- Detection and mitigation of non-Wi-Fi device interference



Let's pull all this together...

Assessing Risk End-to-end



Risk Assessment

RISK	MITIGATION
Unauthorised access to data viewed on mobile device	AnyConnect – control network access ISE – granular access controls once connected
Mobile device lost or stolen	ISE – revoke network access MDM – remote wipe
Unauthorised data stored on mobile device	ISE – granular network access controls *Additional mitigation may be necessary (depending on corporate security policy)
Unauthorised mobile device used to access and/or compromise the wireless network	Various controls – (ISE, network infrastructure, AAA, WIPS, Layer 4 – 7 controls, ACLs, etc.)
Mobile device used to created an unauthorised “hotspot” or bridge to the corporate network	AnyConnect – control active network interfaces on mobile device

Risk Assessment


RISK	MITIGATION
Data transmitted over the wireless infrastructure can be intercepted and read	WPA2 uses AES encryption to protect all transmitted data
Wireless control traffic is altered in transit	Management Frame Protection ensures the integrity of all control traffic
An attacker attempts to compromise the network via spoofed control traffic	Management Frame Protection ensures the integrity of all control traffic
Availability of the wireless network compromised by RF interference, either accidental or malicious	CleanAir automatically detects, classifies and mitigates interference
An attacker attempts to masquerade as a legitimate corporate WLAN	Management Frame Protection (and WIPS – covered later)

Risk Assessment

RISK	MITIGATION
Introduction of wireless network compromises the security of the existing wired network	This risk assessment 😊
Wireless user/device obtains unauthorised access to corporate network resources	Trustsec security group tags (SGT) or VLAN/ACL used for network segmentation
Wireless network users overload current wired network capacity	Assessment of current wired network capacity and remediation if necessary

A Parting Thought

Which is more secure?



OR





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